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CULTURAL HERITAGE TUG OF WAR:
BALANCING PRESERVATION INTERESTS
AND COMMERCIAL RIGHTS
He waka eke noa
A Maori proverb about common property meaning
"A canoe on which everyone may embark."
INTRODUCTION: EXPLORING RIGHTS TO CULTURAL HERITAGE
This Comment explores the clash between indigenous groups fight-
ing to control their intangible cultural heritage' and entities that use
traditional knowledge for inspiration to create commercial works. 2
The beauty and power of native language, legends, songs, folklore,
and history motivates artists, authors, playwrights, and designers to
incorporate aspects of native heritage into different pop culture medi-
ums. Corporations also seek to incorporate indigenous imagery into
their products, services, or marketing because they recognize the com-
mercial value of doing so. Indigenous groups often resist these culture
leaks and seek to control exclusively aspects of their cultural heritage3
that others believe are in the public domain, free for all to use.
First, Part II of this Comment attempts to define cultural heritage.
This is not an easy task as the concept of cultural heritage varies be-
tween groups and encompasses both tangible and intangible aspects.4
This Comment focuses only on the intangible rights associated with
cultural heritage, as opposed to rights in controlling a physical work.5
Part II then traces the development of statutory and case law applica-
1. See Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291, 297-304
(1999). This Comment intends for the term "cultural heritage" to encompass several forms of
traditional knowledge created by individuals, groups, or generations, which include stories,
myths, folklore, and some art. See also Press Release, Estate of T'sunke Witko, One Brewing
Company Settles Lawsuit with the Family of Crazy Horse and Rosebud Sioux Tribe [hereinafter
Estate of T'sunke Witko], available at http://www.ableza.org/CHorse.html (last visited July 20,
2003).
2. For the purpose of this Comment, "commercial works" may include several types of expres-
sions, including plays, books, advertisements, comic books, toys, games, and more.
3. For more information on organized indigenous legal battles for property rights across the
world, see the South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council website, at http://www.noon-
gar.org.au/legal.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
4. See Harding, supra note 1.
5. See Patty Gerstenblith, Protection of Cultural Heritage Found on Private Land: The Para-
digm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings Doctrine After Lucas, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
65, 111 (2000) (advocating the placement of preservation obligations on those who own land
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ble to intangible cultural heritage disputes under the umbrella of intel-
lectual property. The trademark, copyright, and right of publicity
cases represented in this Comment are not necessarily landmark intel-
lectual property decisions; still, all cases involve holdings and facts
that may be applicable to cultural heritage appropriation suits.
To illustrate this complex cultural heritage tug of war,
Part III uses the backdrop of an ongoing, real-life struggle be-
tween the Maori, indigenous tribes of New Zealand,6 and the
with "cultural, historic, and archaeological resources of value and significance both to Native
Americans and to the general public").
6. See generally Ani Mikaere & Craig Coxhead, Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Land Law, 2002
N.Z. L. REV. 415 (2002) (outlining the background on the unique situation of the Maori and
New Zealand's laws affecting this indigenous group's real property rights). See also Government
of New Zealand Archives, available at http://www.archives.govt.nz/holdings/treaty.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2003). The government of New Zealand explains the history behind the Treaty of
Waitangi:
Following a day of heated debate at the house of James Busby, the British Resident, the
Treaty of Waitangi was signed at Waitangi in the Bay of Islands on 6 February 1840 by
Captain William Hobson, several English residents and approximately forty-five Maori
chiefs. The influential chief Tamati Waka Nene turned the debate in favour of the
Treaty. The first Maori to sign was Hone Heke; three other chiefs placed their signature
above his later that day. The document signed at Waitangi was then taken to various
other Northland locations to obtain additional Maori signatures.
To extend Crown authority over parts of the North Island that had not yet been cov-
ered, and the South Island, a further seven copies of the Waitangi document were sent
around the country for signing. The Church Missionary Society press at Paihia, near
Waitangi, printed copies of the Treaty and one of these also was used to obtain further
signatures.
Id. See also Government of New Zealand website, at http://www.govt.nz/en/aboutnz/?id=77737fd
3275e394a8ed9d416a72591d0 (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). The three central parts from the origi-
nal English version of the Treaty of Waitangi capture the spirit of the agreement:
ARTICLE THE FIRST
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate
and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to
Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights
and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respec-
tively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess, over their
respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.
ARTICLE THE SECOND
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of
New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive
and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other
properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish
and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes
and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over
such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may
be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Maj-
esty to treat with them in that behalf.
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LEGO7 Group (LEGO) a Danish toy maker. For the purpose of this
Comment, one must hypothetically place this dispute within the juris-
diction of the United States.8 The Maori object to LEGO's use of
Maori words and historical references 9 in Bionicle, 10 a hi-tech, interac-
tive LEGO game.1 LEGO agreed to modify the game's second gen-
eration,12 yet the struggle continues as the two sides work together to
draft "Guidelines for the Use of Traditional Knowledge. 1 3 The guide-
lines would propose suggestions for all toy makers when incorporating
indigenous cultural elements into their products. The Maori have
used only the power of publicity thus far; no lawsuits have been filed.
Part III analyzes the Maori's possible legal claims against LEGO
under established U.S. law and predicts the likelihood of success
under trademark, copyright, and right of publicity regimes. Essen-
ARTICLE THE THIRD
In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of
New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of
British Subjects.
[Signed] W Hobson Lieutenant Governor
Now therefore We the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zea-
land being assembled in Congress at Victoria in Waitangi and We the Separate and
Independent Chiefs of New Zealand claiming authority over the Tribes and Territories
which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully to understand
the Provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in the full spirit
and meaning thereof in witness of which we have attached our signatures or marks at
the places and the dates respectively specified
Done at Waitangi this Sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and forty.
Id.
7. LEGO is a registered trademark.
8. Jurisdiction could be in either federal or state court, depending on how petitioners chose to
pursue these actions. Federal copyright and trademark laws exist, yet right of publicity is a state
action.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 206-322 (detailing a list of Maori complaints).
10. See LEGO website, at http://www.lego.com/bionicle (last visited Nov. 15, 2003) (explain-
ing the Bionicle story and history).
11. E-mail from Jette Orduna, LEGO, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul University College
of Law (Oct. 25, 2002, 12:09:38 CST) (on file with author). LEGO asserts that it studied a
variety of cultures, not just Maori culture, to construct the Bionicle game. Id.
12. Kim Griggs, Maori Take On Hi-tech LEGO Toys, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26 2001), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/1619406.stm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
13. See id. "Traditional Knowledge" is analogous to cultural heritage. The Maori adopted the
term traditional knowledge to refer to indigenous legends, stories, folklore, history, etc. that may
be used by commercial entities to develop products. The "Guidelines for the Use of Traditional
Knowledge" (Guidelines) that LEGO has pledged to draft with the Maori and other indigenous
groups will not be legally binding, rather, they will comprise suggestions to manufacturers on
how to preserve the integrity of traditional knowledge. The Guidelines have yet to be released
and it is possible that they will never be completed as LEGO and all of the indigenous groups
involved in the process struggle to agree on appropriate terms.
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tially, this analysis concludes that the Maori claims would likely fail
under U.S. standards, which generally do not protect facts, history, or
language.14
The dispute over the right to use indigenous cultural heritage ex-
tends far beyond this one example. Tracing the Maori/LEGO dispute
sheds light on the greater question applicable in all cases of cultural
heritage ownership: Can a group control the commercial use of its
culture and its history? This Comment argues that, while valid claims
of cultural heritage appropriation exist, the Maori, in this instance,
may not lay claim to facts, language, and bits of history rightfully
found in the public domain. 15 Yet, this Comment also concludes that
U.S. law is inadequate to safeguard cultural heritage as a whole and
that lawmakers should explore alternative constructs for protection.
This Comment assumes that the Maori would instigate any legal ac-
tion in the United States and that standing would not be an issue. 16
This assumption allows an in-depth review of the U.S. legal regimes
that could possibly protect different types of cultural heritage.
Part IV recognizes a future trend of valid cultural heritage disputes
in the United States and suggests a possible compromise to resolve the
debate: a legal structure of domaine public payant.17 The progressive
system of domaine public payant permits the public to access valuable
cultural heritage, yet allows for compensation to source indigenous
groups. This system strikes a fair balance between access rights and
rights to control the commercialization of cultural heritage.
14. This is true unless the language was used in a unique signaling capacity. See infra notes 23-
89 and accompanying text.
15. This Comment concludes that the Maori, in this instance, would not receive intellectual
property protection because their hypothetical claims are to language and history only, which
rightfully belong in the public domain, free for all to use. Conversely, there could be other valid
claims to cultural heritage, offered by the Maori or other indigenous groups, that current U.S.
law does not protect, yet should.
16. In reality, the Maori would likely seek redress against LEGO in either New Zealand or
Denmark; however, litigation in the United States is not improbable as the United States is
likely one of LEGO's prime markets. This Comment will not address the issue of standing in
depth, still, it should be noted that the Maori could face a high hurdle when asserting collective
rights in the United States.
17. For purposes of this Comment, consider a domaine public payant structure as a type of
middle or "gray domain" that houses cultural heritage elements that may not belong in either
the private or the public domains.
[Vol. 53:875
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II. BACKGROUND: -DEFINING CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE
EVOLUTION OF U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES
THAT COULD APPLY TO ITS PROTECTION
This section first explores the meaning of "cultural heritage." Next,
it outlines the basic legal concepts of three U.S. intellectual property
regimes: trademark, copyright, and the right of publicity. Following
each outline is a series of relevant cases that could apply to cultural
heritage disputes.
A. Cultural Intellectual Property v. Cultural Heritage
Indigenous groups often draw on their unique experiences, perspec-
tives, and histories to develop stores of cultural art, music, and litera-
ture. Many indigenous and nonindigenous consumers are drawn to
native style and technique. This creates a market for native-made
goods; it also gives corporations the incentive to use indigenous ele-
ments in their products.18 This practice sparks questions over whether
indigenous groups control the intellectual property rights to certain
elements of their culture, and whether they have the right to keep
such elements out of the public domain. Weighing in on the opposite
side of this debate is the interest in unrestricted access to facts, his-
tory, and ideas.
The phrase "cultural intellectual property" connotes intangible
ownership rights in cultural works that would likely meet the require-
ments of standard intellectual property laws.19 Alternatively, "cul-
18. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc., American Girl website, at http://www.americangirlstore.com/pls/ag/
ag-agc-kaya?catid=375909 (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). In the United States, Native American
culture has found its way into several consumer markets, including clothing, interior design, art,
cinema, toys, and more. A popular Mattel line, the American Girl Series, offers a Native Ameri-
can doll, Kaya. Mattel describes Kaya on its website:
KayaTM (KY-yaah) is an adventurous Nez Perce girl growing up in 1764. She's happiest
when she's riding her beloved horse Steps High, playing with her tiny pup Tatlo, or
sharing stories with her blind sister as they work. Kaya dreams of becoming a coura-
geous leader for her people who is ready to meet whatever the future brings. She draws
strength from her family, the legends her elders tell, and the bold warrior woman who
is her hero.
Id.
See also Wal-Mart's website, at http://www.walmart.com/catalog/product.gsp?product-id=882
829&cat=5281&type=5&dept=4171&path=0%3A4171%3A4187%3A4177%3A5281 (last visited
July 20, 2003). Wal-Mart carries another popular Mattel product that capitalizes on Native
American culture, Northwest Native American Barbie. Id. The doll, which sells for $15, comes
with a blue dress, white boots, and a "ceremonial blanket called a chilkat." Id.
19. An example might be an original fable recently written by a single, identifiable Native
American author. Such work of cultural significance may qualify for copyright protection and,
therefore, be considered "cultural intellectual property." This connotes clear intangible rights to
the work under current U.S. intellectual property regimes.
2003] 879
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:875
tural heritage"20 encompasses a broader range, applying to history,
language, art, traditions, oral compositions, written works, and more.
Complicating any attempts to define this category is the fact that myr-
iad elements qualify as cultural heritage. Further, cultural heritage
works are often intergenerational, 21 group efforts that do not fit neatly
into trademark, copyright, or state intellectual property regimes.
A central inquiry to this discussion is the following: When does cul-
tural heritage that is stored in the public domain cross the line to be-
come cultural intellectual property, which enjoys exclusive ownership
rights? Furthermore, when should this transformation occur; when do
groups have rights to control works that simply do not meet the re-
quirements for modern U.S. intellectual property protection? To form
an opinion on this fundamental rights versus public access problem,
one must understand the basic concepts of three intellectual property
regimes: trademark, copyright, and the state law claim of right of
publicity. 22
B. Trademark Law
Trademark law, unlike copyright law, has no clear constitutional au-
thority.2 3 Therefore, Congress utilized the powers of the Commerce
20. See Kristin Ann Mattiske, Note, Recognition of Indigenous Heritage in the Modern World:
U.S. Legal Protection in Light of International Custom, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1105, 1111 (2002).
While many believe that heritage and history belong to all people of the world to use and to
learn from, Ms. Mattiske defines heritage as belonging to a people:
"Heritage" is everything that belongs to the distinct identity of a people and which is
theirs to share, if they wish, with other peoples. It includes all of those things that
international law regards as the creative production of human thought and craftsman-
ship, such as songs, stories, scientific knowledge and artworks. It also includes inheri-
tances from the past and from nature, such as human remains, the natural features of
the landscape, and naturally occurring species of plants and animals with which a peo-
ple has long been connected.
Id. (citing Erica Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, U.N. Sales No.
E.97.XIV.3 1 236 (1997)).
21. Indigenous works, such as folklore, often develop over time. Authors from each genera-
tion build on an old tale, keeping the core story and adding new elements. The story is like a
living work, continually growing and changing.
22. Another intellectual property regime, patent law, also impacts claims to cultural heritage;
however, patent law and related biopiracy issues exceed the scope of this Comment and thus will
not be explored.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This constitutional provision allows Congress to "Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. This provision serves as
the source for both copyright and patent protection; however, trademark law is not logically
encompassed by Section 8.
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Clause 24 to justify trademark protection2 5 and adopted the Lanham
Act in 1946,26 which codified a scheme of trademark protection.
Trademark law encompasses symbols, such as words, shapes, and
colors,27 used in commerce that signal the source of a good.2 8 The
Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or de-
vice" used by a person to "identify and distinguish his or her goods...
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown. '29
Gilson on Trademark Protection and Practice states that a trademark
functions and receives legal protection because it:
(a) designates the source or origin of a particular product or service,
even though the source is to the consumer anonymous; (b) denotes
a particular standard of quality which is embodied in the product or
service; (c) identifies a product or service and distinguishes it from
the products or services of others; (d) symbolizes the good will of its
owner and motivates consumers to purchase the trademarked prod-
uct or service; (e) represents a substantial advertising investment
and is treated as a species of property; or (f) protects the public
from confusion and deception, insures that consumers are able to
purchase the products and services they want, and enables the
courts to fashion a standard of acceptable business conduct. 30
1. Basics of Trademark Law
To determine the degree of trademark protection received, marks
are categorized according to a common-law hierarchy of descriptive-
ness.31 The order is: (1) generic marks, which are never registrable;
(2) descriptive marks, which are registrable upon proof of secondary
meaning; 32 (3) suggestive marks,33 which are registrable; and (4) arbi-
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 6-7 (1996) (re-
lating that, although the Commerce Clause language denotes that it covers only trade between
countries and states, now the law recognizes the power of the Commerce Clause over intrastate
commerce as well).
26. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
27. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that a color is registra-
ble if (1) it meets the ordinary requirements to register a trademark and (2) its use as a mark
would not allow the owner to interfere with legitimate competition).
28. Service marks apply to services while trademarks refer to goods. An example of a fic-
tional service mark would be MONEYZIP to signal a special wire transfer service offered by an
investment bank.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
30. JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03 (2002).
31. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
32. Id. at 9.
33. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 25, at 42-43. To be suggestive, a mark must require
the consumer to use some imagination to connect it to the source of the good or service. Id. A
common example of a suggestive mark would be SIZZLER for steakhouses.
2003]
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trary or fanciful marks, 34 which garner the highest trademark
protection.
Trademark law turns on consumer protection; the touchstone of
trademark infringement is the likelihood of consumer confusion.35 To
gain registration, a mark must not be likely to confuse the public as to
its source or sponsorship.36 Further, a showing of likelihood of confu-
sion is adequate to prove trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act.37 It is important to note that preclusion from registration does
not necessarily prohibit an applicant from using the mark.38 Outlined
below is an example in which an indigenous group successfully em-
ployed trademark law to halt the registration of a mark in the name of
cultural heritage protection. The legal victory was not complete, how-
ever, because the petitioners could not bar the respondent from using
the mark, and stopping the respondent from using the marks was, ulti-
mately, what the petitioners in this case wanted.39
2. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. 40
In Harjo, seven Native American petitioners succeeded in their
move to cancel federal registrations 41 with the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) for several service marks, 42 includ-
ing: THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS, REDSKINS, 43 and RED-
34. See id.
35. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) (barring use of a registered mark that is
"likely to cause confusion").
36. See id. § 1114.
37. Lois Sportswear U.S.A. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 873-76 (2d Cir. 1986) (listing
eight factors relevant to the likelihood of infringement inquiry: (1) strength of plaintiff's mark,
(2) the degree of similarity between the marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) likelihood
that plaintiff will bridge the gap to encompass defendant's product line, (5) evidence of actual
consumer confusion, (6) whether defendant acted in good faith, (7) the quality of the respective
goods, and (8) the sophistication of relevant buyers).
38. Note, however, that unfair competition laws could possibly prohibit use of a confusing
mark, registered or unregistered, that usurps a senior competitor's market.
39. Generally, indigenous groups involved in disputes over cultural heritage seek first to stop
the use of the cultural heritage in question. Therefore, barring trademark applicants from re-
ceiving registration is a hollow victory if those applicants are still able to employ the mark in
question.
40. 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
41. See id. at 1705-06. Cancellation No. 21,069 to Registration Nos. 1,606,810; 1,085,092;
987,127; 986,668; 978,824; 836,122.
42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
43. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707. THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS and RED-
SKINS were registered for "entertainment services-namely, presentations of professional foot-
ball contests." Id.
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SKINNETTES, 44 which all refer to the Washington Redskins football
franchise. The corporate owner of these marks, Pro-Football, Inc.
(Pro-Football), vigorously challenged this action.45  Pro-Football
claimed that REDSKINS had acquired a secondary meaning,46 repre-
senting the Washington football team only, not Native Americans.
The issue before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
concerned only the registrability of the marks, not whether Pro-Foot-
ball, or any other entity, could use the marks.47 Petitioners sought to
cancel the marks under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the
registration of marks that are "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous," or
that "may disparage or falsely suggest a connection" with people, "in-
stitutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt or
disrepute. ' 48 The exact language of § 2(a) was key to the petitioners'
courtroom victory. The TTAB noted that the statute prohibited regis-
44. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707. REDSKINETTES was registered for "en-
tertainment services, namely, cheerleaders who perform dance routines at professional football
games." Id.
45. Pro-Football had a strong motive to fight the cancellation of all marks related to the Wash-
ington Redskins team. Sports teams regularly strike licensing deals with manufacturers of ap-
parel, mugs, school supplies, cereal, and more. Upon cancellation of the trademarks, Pro-
Football would lose control of the marks' use, resulting in the loss of some licensing revenues.
This relates only to the REDSKINS mark and other trademarks in question. Pro-Football may
still control any logos that were not deemed unregistrable by § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Yet,
overall, losing control of the team's name probably had a negative financial impact on the team.
46. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 25, at 44. A mark acquires secondary meaning when
the service or good it signifies becomes the primary meaning in the mind of the consumer. Id.
For example, a person's or character's name is a descriptive term that describes that specific
person or character. Yet a name could acquire secondary meaning. Harry Potter is the name of
the lead character in the wildly popular children's book series by J.K. Rowling. Time Warner,
Inc. (Time Warner) owns the HARRY POTTER trademark. If another entity were to employ
the name HARRY POTTER to identify a boy wizard in a television series, Time Warner could
institute a Lanham Act trademark infringement claim. The opponent would likely argue that a
name is merely descriptive and unworthy of protection. Time Warner could counter by claiming
that HARRY POTTER had acquired secondary meaning in the public mind because HARRY
POTTER had become synonymous with the young wizard found in J.K. Rowling's books. Mar-
ket saturation of the book had resulted in the boy wizard transforming into the primary defini-
tion of HARRY POTTER. This acquisition of secondary meaning converts a merely descriptive
mark into protectable intellectual property.
47. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
48. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000). The relevant portions of § 2 of the Lanham Act
provide:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods
of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature
unless it-
(a) Consists of or compromises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute
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tration of marks that are immoral, deceptive, or scandalous; however,
lowering the threshold, it barred all marks that may disparage people
or bring them into disrepute. 49 Ultimately, the T-AB held that all of
Pro-Football's registrations may disparage Native Americans, which
justified cancellation.50 The TTAB did not, however, officially label
the marks immoral, deceptive, or scandalous. 51
To reach this partial pro-cultural heritage protection conclusion, the
TTAB heard testimony from the petitioners' and respondent's experts
in the fields of history, linguistics, and social science. 52 Generally, the
petitioners demonstrated that the term "Redskins" in any form was
deeply offensive to Native Americans 53 and was so at the time of re-
gistration in the 1960s.54 Pro-Football responded with expert testi-
mony that "Redskins" was an innocuous term akin to "Native
American" or "American Indian. ''55 The TTAB found the petition-
ers' evidence more convincing and canceled the respondent's marks;
however, note that the Washington Redskins football team still exists
today, despite its trademark cancellation. Use was not at issue; only
the registrability of REDSKINS as a protectable mark was before the
TTAB. Further, petitioners gained no rights to the marks themselves.
3. Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court56
Not all marks canceled under § 2(a) survive in the marketplace, as
did REDSKINS. The Lakota Sioux succeeded in a cancellation peti-
tion against the Hornell Brewing Company, which placed renowned
Native American Crazy Horse's image on a malt liquor product. 57
The Lakota Sioux also pursued action in a tribal court58 to enjoin Hor-
nell's production of Crazy Horse Malt Liquor.59 The petitioners
49. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
50. Id. at 1749.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1723-34.
53. Id. at 1720. Petitioners argued that the term "Redskins" reflected a patronizing, demean-
ing attitude towards Native Americans, which promulgated views of Native Americans as "sim-
ple 'savages' whose culture was treated mainly as a source of amusement for white culture." Id.
54. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719. In a § 2(a) cancellation action, the Board considers
the status of the marks from the time of registration to the present. Id. at 1735.
55. Id. at 1720.
56. 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998).
57. See generally Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property
Rights in Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355 (1998) (explain-
ing that Crazy Horse was a Sioux leader known for his crusades against alcoholism among his
people).
58. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1997) (concluding that tribal courts
have jurisdiction in only limited circumstances).
59. Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998).
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claimed that Hornell's use of Crazy Horse's name and image 60 re-
sulted in defamation, a violation of Crazy Horse's estate's right of
publicity, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, vi-
olation of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act,61 and trademark violations
60. Hornell Brewing Co. v. Minn. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, Liquor Control Div., 553 N.W.2d 713.
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996). On the bottle's label, the words "The Original Crazy Horse Malt Li-
quor" surrounded an image of an American Indian wearing a feathered headdress. Beneath the
product name were the words "Dakota Hills, Ltd." The text on the label's reverse side read:
The Black Hills of Dakota, steeped in the history of the American West, home of Proud
Indian Nations. A land where imagination conjures up images of blue clad Pony
Soldiers and magnificent Native American Warriors. A land where willful winds
whisper of Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse and Custer. A land of character, of bravery, of
tradition. A land that truly speaks of the spirit that is America.
Id. at 715.
61. See Indian Arts and Crafts Act, 25 U.S.C. § 305a-305e (1990). The language of the Indian
Arts and Crafts Act refers to intellectual property as well as real property. This Act may be a
useful tool for some groups in their fight to protect cultural heritage; however, the Indian Arts
and Crafts Act would not benefit the Maori. The relevant section of the Indian Arts and Crafts
Act reads:
§ 305a. Promotion of economic welfare through development of arts and crafts; powers
of Board
It shall be the function and the duty of the Secretary of the Interior through the Board
to promote the economic welfare of the Indian tribes and the Indian individuals
through the development of Indian arts and crafts and the expansion of the market for
the products of Indian art and craftsmanship. In the execution of this function the
Board shall have the following powers: (a) To undertake market research to determine
the best opportunity for the sale of various products; (b) to engage in technical research
and give technical advice and assistance; (c) to engage in experimentation directly or
through selected agencies; (d) to correlate and encourage the activities of the various
governmental and private agencies in the field; (e) to offer assistance in the manage-
ment of operating groups for the furtherance of specific projects; (f) to make recom-
mendations to appropriate agencies for loans in furtherance of the production and sale
of Indian products; (g)(1) to create for the Board, or for an individual Indian or Indian
tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization, trademarks of genuineness and quality for
Indian products and the products of an individual Indian or particular Indian tribe or
Indian arts and crafts organization; (2) to establish standards and regulations for the
use of Government-owned trademarks by corporations, associations, or individuals,
and to charge for such use under such licenses; (3) to register any such trademark
owned by the Government in the United States Patent and Trademark Office without
charge and assign it and the goodwill associated with it to an individual Indian or In-
dian tribe without charge; and (4) to pursue or defend in the courts any appeal or
proceeding with respect to any final determination of that office; (h) to employ execu-
tive officers, including a general manager, and such other permanent and temporary
personnel as may be found necessary, and prescribe the authorities, duties, responsibili-
ties, and tenure and fix the compensation of such officers and other employees: Pro-
vided, That the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, shall be applicable to all
permanent employees [except executive officers,] and that all employees [other than
executive officers] shall be appointed in accordance with the civil-service laws from lists
of eligibles to be supplied by the Civil Service Commission; (i) as a Government agency
to negotiate and execute in its own name contracts with operating groups to supply
management, personnel, and supervision at cost, and to negotiate and execute in its
own name such other contracts and to carry on such other business as may be necessary
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under the Lanham Act.62 The tribal court found for the Lakota
Sioux. 63 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit dismissed this action, claiming that the tribal court had
no jurisdiction over this matter.64 The court, however, did not criticize
the tribal court's ruling on the merits. 65
Despite this favorable ruling, Stroh Brewing Company, owner of G.
Heileman Brewing Company and a defendant in the Crazy Horse
Malt Liquor case, chose to settle with the Estate of Crazy Horse and
the Rosebud Sioux Tribe.66 The settlement agreement provided for "a
public apology and acknowledgment of the Estate's right to protect
the name of Crazy Horse, and for delivery of culturally appropriate
damages-seven race horses and thirty-two Pendleton blankets,
braids of tobacco and sweet grass."'67
A press release from the Estate of T'sunke Witko 68 claims the
Stroh's settlement was a landmark event in the movement to protect
cultural heritage:
This is a historic victory in the battle to protect the name of Crazy
Horse and the cultural property of all tribes. This settlement recog-
nizes the important role of Tribal Customary Law in protecting in-
digenous Intellectual Property and sends a strong message that
people cannot just take Indian Cultural Property and use it without
permission. 69
Crazy Horse Malt Liquor has since disappeared from the market.
Native Americans claim the above two cases as successes in the
struggle for the protection of native cultural heritage. In reality, how-
ever, the two cases discussed above represent mixed victories. In
Harjo, petitioners succeeded in halting registration only, not use.
Hornell culminated with cessation of use and a public apology, how-
ever, this action was not legally mandated. Stroh chose to concede.70
for the accomplishment of the duties and purposes of the Board: Provided, That noth-
ing in the foregoing enumeration of powers shall be construed to authorize the Board
to borrow or lend money or to deal in Indian goods. For the purposes of this section,
the term 'Indian arts and crafts organization' means any legally established arts and
crafts marketing organization composed of members of Indian tribes.
Id. § 305a.
62. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d at 1087.
63. See id. at 1093.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Estate of T'sunke Witko, supra note 1.
67. Id. The date set for delivery of these items was April 26, 2001. Id.
68. Id. T'sunke Witko is the Sioux name for Crazy Horse. See Crazy Horse defense website,
at http://www.crazyhorsedefense.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
69. Estate of T'sunke Witko, supra note 1.
70. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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Again, in neither case did indigenous petitioners gain cultural intellec-
tual property rights to the marks.
Both Harjo and Hornell dealt with clearly offensive 7t use of Native
American symbolism. Many disputes over commercial use of cultural
heritage are not so clear, including the Maori/LEGO issue to be ana-
lyzed in Part III of this Comment. Listed below are general U.S.
trademark decisions that could hinder a group's fight for control of
items it has identified as indigenous cultural heritage.
4. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut v. Mohegan Tribe and
Nation, Inc.72
In this Lanham Act litigation, a federally recognized Native Ameri-
can tribe challenged another group of similar ancestry for rights to the
MOHEGAN and MOHEGAN TRIBE marks.73 The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant nation's use of these marks harmed the
Mohegan people and injured the plaintiff as well. 74 Plaintiff owned
and operated the Mohegan Sun Casino and related facilities while the
defendant traded only in arts and crafts. 75
To receive protection under the Lanham Act, one must (1) possess
a valid, protectable trademark and (2) establish that the defendant's
use of the mark is likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the
goods at issue.76 The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the
plaintiffs failed to establish these requirements; Mohegan was a ge-
neric term, ineligible for Lanham Act protection and the plaintiff did
not establish a likelihood of confusion. 77
The court also noted that this trademark dispute was unique: "On
appeal, the parties have failed to identify any case under the Lanham
Act, and we have found none, in which the word or term for which
71. See Estate of T'sunke Witko, supra note 1. It is safe to say that many, even if not a
majority, of Americans could agree that the term "Redskins" is pejorative and that labeling a
malt liquor with Crazy Horse's image would offend Native Americans. The press release quotes
one outraged tribal member:
"They have taken his name and slapped it on a cheap beer for a quick buck," said Seth
H. Big Crow, Sr., administrator for the Estate of T'Sunke Witko, a.k.a. Crazy Horse,
who hailed the long awaited decision as a major victory in the protection of cultural
rights. "Crazy Horse fought and died protecting Indian people from things like alcohol.
His spirit and reputation deserve greater respect," said Big Crow from his home on the
Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota.
Id.
72. 769 A.2d 34 (Conn. 2001).
73. Id. at 34.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 36.
76. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt, Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 1999).
77. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Conn., 769 A.2d at 48.
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trademark protection was sought is, as in this case, a term used by a
defendant to identify its nationality, ethnicity or ancestry. ' 78 This case
sets a precedent that tribal names are generic, which narrows the
availability for trademark protection in similar cultural heritage
disputes.
The following cases do not have indigenous plaintiffs. Instead, they
deal with marks that revolve around nationality and foreign language
words. These cases could be helpful while reviewing the hypothetical
legal actions arising from the Maori/LEGO dispute.
5. Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publications, Inc.79
This case dealt with genericness under the Lanham Act. In this dis-
pute, a telephone directory distributor claimed that a competitor's use
of the mark FILIPINO YELLOW PAGES infringed his trademarks
for a line of local and international Filipino telephone directories.80
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff's claim and held that FILIPINO YELLOW PAGES was ge-
neric, or at best merely descriptive,81 and not worthy of trademark
protection.8 2
6. Otokoyama Co., v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc.83
In this trademark dispute, both the plaintiff and the defendant im-
ported Japanese sake 84 for distribution in the United States under
similar trademarks.8 5  The plaintiff sold sake under the
OTOKOYAMA brand since 1984 and held four registered trademarks
incorporating that mark.8 6 The defendant entered the U.S. market in
1997 with its "Mutsu Otokoyama. '8 7
The defendant contended that the plaintiff's OTOKOYAMA mark
translated to "sake" in Japanese, the generic name for this fermented
rice wine. 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit vacated the preliminary injunction granted by the lower court and
held the defendant's evidence of genericness, even of a foreign word,
78. Id. at 42 n.20.
79. 198 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 1145.
81. Id. at 1151.
82. Id.
83. 175 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 1999).
84. Sake is a type of strong Japanese rice wine. Id. at 268.
85. Otokoyama Co., 175 F.3d at 268.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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cast serious doubt on the plaintiff's trademark rights to
OTOKOYAMA. 89
As these cases demonstrate, current trademark jurisprudence pro-
vides no clear path in determining cultural heritage rights. When cul-
tural heritage is appropriated egregiously, trademark law may be able
to bar registration or even use in rare situations. Other types of
claims, including the hypothetical Maori claims, struggle to find full
protection under U.S. trademark laws.
C. Copyright Law
Copyright law has clear roots in the United States Constitution Ar-
ticle I, Section 8, Clause 8. This clause allows Congress to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." 90 Congress codified these protections in the
Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act), 91 ensuring authors finite con-
trol over their works. The fundamentals of copyright law consist of
three requirements; protected works must be: (1) original; (2) works
of authorship; and (3) fixed in a tangible medium of expression.92
Even though the Copyright Act attempts to define clearly the re-
quirements for protection, the parameters are often ambiguous. For
89. See id. at 273. The court only vacated the preliminary injunction; it did not officially hold
that plaintiff's trademark was generic. Id.
90. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
91. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1978). The Copyright Act defines subject matter in
§ 102, which provides:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following
categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis-
covery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or em-
bodied in such work.
Id. § 102 (a), (b).
92. See id. § 102.
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example, the three basic requirements of originality, authorship, and
fixation conflict fundamentally with products of cultural heritage.
1. Originality and Authorship
The first two requirements for copyright protection are tied closely
together. Section 101 of the Copyright Act does not define "original"
or "author" explicitly. However, review of case law reveals that com-
plete novelty is not required to meet the originality requirement for
copyrighted works.93 Originality exists in "substantial and sufficient
degree, in the conception, organization and presentation of material
whether new or old. As to what is old, only the common source, not
the copyrighted work, except as to fair use, may be resorted to by all,
for only the old lies in the public domain. '94
A landmark United States Supreme Court case, Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., further defines "original. '95 In
copyright law, "original" requires that the work was created indepen-
dently by an author, not copied from other works, and that it possess
"at least some minimal degree of creativity. '96 Work may be original
even though it closely resembles other works, so long as "similarity is
fortuitous, not the result of copying. ' 97 This definition reinforces the
concept that novelty is not requisite to originality.
The concept of "author" may seem clear; however, the term has
given rise to confusion. In 1884, the Supreme Court attempted to de-
fine authorship in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.98 It con-
cluded that "author," in a constitutional sense, meant "he to whom
anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work
of science or literature."99
93. See generally Addison-Wesley Publ'g Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
94. Id. at 224.
95. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (reversing a judgment in
favor of respondent because the selection, coordination, and arrangement of respondent's white
pages telephone book contained only uncopyrightable facts, which did not satisfy the minimum
constitutional requirements for copyright protection; the arrangement was not sufficiently
original).
96. See id. at 345.
97. Id.
98. 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
99. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (upholding a finding of
infringement against defendant lithographic company regarding a photograph of Oscar Wilde,
by which authorship rights could be conferred). The Court noted:
These findings, we think, show this photograph to be an original work of art, the prod-
uct of plaintiff's intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author, and of a class of
inventions for which the Constitution intended that Congress should secure to him the
exclusive right to use, publish and sell ....
Id. at 60.
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Recent case law builds on this nineteenth century definition to clar-
ify and expand the concept of authorship. In Lindsay v. Titanic,10° the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted authorship status to a documentary producer even though he
did not physically procure the photos and footage used in the film.10 1
The plaintiff and the defendant had agreed to coproduce a documen-
tary detailing underwater explorations of the sunken Titanic,10 2 yet
the defendant backed out of the plan.10 3 In litigation, the defendant
claimed that the plaintiff could not be considered an author under the
Copyright Act because he did not dive to the ship and actually take
the photographs. 10 4 The court rejected that argument and held:
[W]here a plaintiff alleges that he exercised such a high degree of
control over a film operation-including the type and amount of
lighting used, the specific camera angles to be employed, and other
detail-intensive artistic elements of a film-such that the final prod-
uct duplicates his conceptions and visions of what the film should
look like, the plaintiff may be said to be an "author" within the
meaning of the Copyright Act. t0 5
This holding reinterprets the authorship requirements of the Copy-
right Act that the author of a work is the person "who actually creates
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangi-
ble expression .... ,106 The court viewed authorship requirements in
100. 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
101. See id. at 1612-13.
102. The Titanic was a luxury cruise liner billed as "unsinkable." Tragically, the Titanic struck
an iceberg on its maiden voyage to New York in 1912, killing several passengers. The infamous
Titanic tragedy has inspired several films, books, songs, plays, poems, and more. Id. at 1611.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1613. The defendant and his crew were part of a professional salvage crew.
The plaintiff was not a direct part of the salvage and exploration effort; instead, he was a creative
director and contributor. The court said the following about the plaintiff's role:
The fact that Lindsay did not literally perform the filming, i.e. by diving to the wreck
and operating the cameras, will not defeat his claims of having "authored" the illumi-
nated footage. The plaintiff alleges that as part of his pre-production efforts, he created
so-called "storyboards," a series of drawings which incorporated images of the Titanic
by identifying specific camera angles and shooting sequences. During the expedition
itself, Lindsay claims to have been "the director, producer and cinematographer" of the
underwater footage. As part of this role, Lindsay alleges that he directed daily planning
sessions with the film crew to provide them with "detailed instructions for positioning
and utilizing the light towers." Moreover, the plaintiff actually "directed the filming" of
the Titanic from on board the Ocean Voyager, the salvage vessel that held the crew and
equipment. Finally, Lindsay screened the footage at the end of each day to "confirm
that he had obtained the images he wanted."
Id.
105. Lindsay, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1613.
106. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1978)) (holding that a sculpture was not a work-made-for-hire because the artist retained con-
trol and independence over the project and therefore held the copyright to the piece). This
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the context of film footage and photography to expand the defini-
tion. 0 7 This holding demonstrates that courts are willing to mold cop-
yright definitions to fit changing needs, which could certainly impact
cultural heritage litigation.
2. Joint Authorship
In the cultural heritage context, works are often intergenerational,
the product of several authors over a series of decades, even centu-
ries, 108 which conflicts with the defined notions of originality and au-
thorship. The traditional notion of authorship is singular; 10 9 yet courts
have established a history of accepting joint authorship in certain
cases. The Copyright Act defines joint authorship as a work "pre-
pared by two or more authors with the intention that their contribu-
tions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole."'110 The key to joint authorship is joint labor; to share a copy-
right all authors must intend to be joint authors and intend the final
landmark case demonstrated the separability of authorship and physical ownership of a copy-
righted work. Reid, the author of a three-dimensional sculpture depicting homelessness won
authorship rights while the Community for Creative Non-Violence received property rights in
the physical sculpture itself. Id. at 753. It is important to note the Court entertained the idea
that the Community for Creative Non-Violence may be a joint-author due to its significant con-
tributions. Id.
107. Lindsay, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1609. The court performed a concise, comprehensive review
of the evolution of the definition of authorship:
For over 100 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that photographs may receive
copyright protection in "so far as they are representatives of original intellectual con-
ceptions of the author." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58,28 L.
Ed. 349, 4 S. Ct. 279 (1884). An individual claiming to be an author for copyright pur-
poses must show "the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production,
of thought, and conception." Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Com-
pany, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346-347, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (citing
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60). Some elements of originality in a photograph include
"posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired
expression, and almost any variant involved." Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934, 121 L. Ed. 2d 278, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992). Taken as true,
the plaintiff's allegations meet this standard. Lindsay's alleged storyboards and the spe-
cific directions he provided to the film crew regarding the use of the lightowers and the
angles from which to shoot the wreck all indicate that the final footage would indeed be
the product of Lindsay's "original intellectual conceptions."
Id.
108. E-mail from Maui Solomon, Maori Attorney, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law (Nov. 11, 2002, 10:59:13 CST) (on file with author). Mr. Solomon points out
that the Intellectual Property system is inadequate to protect "traditional knowledge in the pub-
lic domain" because it protects only private property rights and not "collective/intergenerational
rights and obligations." Id.
109. See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
110. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978).
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product to be an inseparable melting pot of joint expression."' How-
ever, joint authors need not work together in concert; they need only
have the intention to create a joint work at the outset.112 The availa-
bility of non-linear joint authorship could pertain to cultural heritage
such as folklore or native songs passed from generation to generation.
3. Indigenous Oral Cultures
Further, concepts of originality and authorship do not conform to
indigenous oral cultures. An example of an oral culture is ancient In-
dia, where history and tradition was viewed in a collective sense of
"peoples" rather than "individuals. ' ' 113 In ancient India's oral culture,
the people placed more weight on "what was said" as opposed to
"who said what."' 14 Bali exemplifies a more recent oral culture,
where the personal possession of artistic property was a foreign con-
cept.1 5 Balinese people subscribed to the belief that the production
of culture was a collective, anonymous effort that could not be held by
one particular class.116
4. Fixation
The third requirement for copyright protection, fixation, also fails
to conform to elements of cultural heritage, especially oral cultures.
Unlike the first two requirements, the Copyright Act does define
fixation:117
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its em-
bodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images,
or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this
111. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT LAW § 6.03 (2003).
Without such a preconcerted common design the resulting combination should not be
regarded as a joint work. This does not mean, however, that the several authors must
necessarily work in physical propinquity, or in concert, nor that the respective contribu-
tions made by each joint author must be equal either in quantity or quality. Neither is
an express "collaboration agreement" necessary to create a joint-author relationship.
Id.
112. See id. Indeed, joint authors, given that they each had the clear intent at the outset to be
joint authors, need not even know one another personally nor do their contributions need to be
simultaneous. Id. at 6-7.
113. RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 12-13 (Herbert I. Schiller ed., 1996).
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id. at 13.
116. Id.
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission.' 18
As noted above, indigenous cultures often rely on oral traditions and
works. Consequently, this fixation requirement is nearly impossible to
meet. Stories and songs are often never transferred to paper, yet exist
only in the mind of the storyteller. 119 Therefore, "fixation" in the
teller's mind, or even in the listeners' minds, falls short of U.S. copy-
right requirements because no "tangible medium of expression"
results.
Having established the basic framework for U.S. copyright protec-
tion and its conflicts with cultural heritage, this section now examines
copyright case law with potential to shape future holdings in cultural
heritage litigation.
5. Fendler v. Morosco120
In 1930, the Court of Appeals of New York reiterated the theme
"ideas ... are as free as air.1121 In Fendler v. Morosco, an author and
producer sought review of a trial court decision, which granted an in-
junction and more than $780,000 to plaintiff playwright. 122 The plain-
tiff wrote In Hawaii, a play that told the story of a young American
doctor who traveled to Hawaii, discovered the germ of leprosy, and
fell in love with a beautiful, proud Hawaiian princess. 23 In the defen-
dant author's play, Bird of Paradise, a young American college gradu-
ate went to Hawaii to work among the lepers of Molokai, where he
fell in love with the daughter of a Hawaiian priest.' 24 Both plays in-
cluded elements of native Hawaiian culture, including customs, hula
dances, songs, myths, and religion. 125
The court held that the defendants, even if they did have access to
the plaintiff's script, did not copy material elements. 26 Despite the
similarity of the plays, they differed substantially; the overall themes
118. Id. § 101.
119. BETTIG, supra note 113, at 13-14 (noting that Medieval Europe was also a primarily oral
culture where the medieval listener respected the actual form of the communication over
authorship).
120. 171 N.E. 56 (N.Y. 1930).
121. Id. at 58.
122. Id. at 56.
123. Id. at 59.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Fendler, 171 N.E. at 60. ("The literary larcenist must do more than filch ideas, imitate
mannerisms, repeat information, borrow phrases, utilize quotations; you must be able to attri-
bute to him the felonious intention of appropriating without independent labour a material part
of a protected work.").
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of an American traveling to Hawaii to study leprosy and finding love
are simply ideas. 127 Ideas are not copyrightable; 128 therefore, the
court reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint. 129
6. Malkin v. Dubinsky130
Thirty years after the Hawaiian theme dispute, another playwright
petitioned a New York court to protect the copyright in his play.t 3I
This author also lost.' 32
Malkin wrote, but had not yet published, a play entitled The Battle
Goes On, a melodrama that portrayed a strike in the textile industry
and highlighted the personal life of Harry Silverstein, one of the work-
ers. 133 Harry led the strike, but his son opposed it and worked against
his father. 134 Harry's daughter sympathized with the strikers and was
in love with the boss's son.' 35 At the close of The Battle Goes On,
Harry was fatally shot. 36
The plaintiff contended that he sent the play to the defendant union
to solicit production, but the union representatives turned down the
manuscript and, instead, produced their own similar play, With These
Hands.137 The defendants' play incorporated themes used in the
plaintiff's work, such as strikes, pickets, bad blood between the union
and employers, and family money troubles. 138
After noting substantial differences between the two plays, the New
York Supreme Court went on to reiterate that any similar borrowed
ideas from the plaintiff's play were not original139 and, therefore, not
worthy of copyright protection. 140 Citing to Fendler, this court stated:
127. Id.
128. Id. at 58 (citing AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 167 (1899)). "Ideas... are as free as air. If you happen to have any, you
fling them into the common stock, and ought to be well content to see your poorer brethren
thriving upon them." Id.
129. Fendler, 171 N.E. at 61.
130. 203 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 511.
133. Id. at 503.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Malkin, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 506 (citing Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1943)). "A copyright
extends only to the arrangement of the words. A copyright does not give a monopoly in any
incident in a play. Other authors have a right to exploit the facts, experiences, fields of thought.,
and general ideas, provided they do not substantially copy a concrete form .... " Id.
140. Id.
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"Plots and incidents taken out of the public domain are not suscepti-
ble of copyright and are not protectable. '' 141 Consequently, the court
awarded judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the plain-
tiff's complaint on the merits.' 42
7. Gilliam v. ABC, Inc.143
In 1976, the authors of the popular Monty Python's Flying Circus
television series sought copyright protection in the New York courts
when American Broadcasting Company (ABC) edited the programs
for rebroadcast in the United States.144 The plaintiffs, the Monty Py-
thon author/performer group, created the series for broadcast by the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and retained strict creative
controls.1 45
ABC licensed three ninety-minute Monty Python episodes from
BBC in 1973 and planned to broadcast them "back-to-back."'' 46 To
make room for commercials, ABC edited out approximately twenty-
four minutes of each ninety-minute episode; ABC also omitted con-
tent because the original programs contained "offensive or obscene
matter." 147
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit barred
the broadcast, granting the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on the
theory that the defendant's severe edits were a mutilation of the plain-
tiffs' copyrighted work 148 that constituted copyright infringement.1 4 9
141. Malkin, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 506. The court went on to say it would be "ridiculous" to state
that President Franklin D. Roosevelt's election would be subject to copyright simply by "incor-
porating that event into a play." Id.
142. Id. at 510-11. The court stated:
After reading the play, viewing the motion picture, examining the alleged similarities,
appraising and evaluating all the evidence, and in the light of all of the surrounding
circumstances, I am satisfied that there is no warrant for this litigation. I find and con-
clude from the credible evidence and the inferences logically flowing therefrom, that
the critical changes and appendage in plaintiff's manuscript were not written in 1947,
but after the summer of 1950. I also find and conclude that there is no satisfactory
showing of access to plaintiff's manuscript by defendants. I further find and conclude
that there has been no appropriation by defendants of plaintiff's property, and that the
few similarities that exist are both trivial and insignificant or in the public domain.
Consequently, judgment is awarded in favor of the defendants, dismissing the com-
plaint on the merits.
Id.
143. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id. Monty Python wanted to ensure that the final production comported with their origi-
nal vision and was not tainted by interference. Id.
146. Id. at 18.
147. Id.
148. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21. The court explained:
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When considered in a cultural heritage context, this case law could
provide protection for copyrighted stories that are reworked and
retold in a commercial setting. Altering the cultural heritage work to
suit commercial tastes could mislead the public into believing the
source indigenous group sponsored the new, edited final form, when
in fact the group may object to the changes.
8. Hogan v. DC Comics150
In 1999, the plaintiff comic book authors claimed that the defen-
dant's painted novel infringed their work.15' Again, the New York
District Court held that the ideas used in both works were rightfully
found in the public domain and that no one author could gain exclu-
sive control over them.152
The plaintiff's futuristic work, Matchsticks, was an episodical, vio-
lent comic book with gothic themes that centered on a half-vampire,
half-human character named Nicholas Gaunt. 153 The story incorpo-
rated the themes of (1) seeking out one's identity and past and (2)
facing the internal conflict between good and evil.154
The plaintiff, a graphic novelist, claimed that the defendant had ac-
cess to his work because he sent samples to DC Comics while pursu-
ing publication and work as an "inker."'1 55 DC Comics later released a
book entitled Dhampire that also featured a half-vampire, half-human
named Nicholas Gaunt. 156 The two works had several similarities:
both were gothic and macabre; both used religious symbolism and bib-
The rationale for finding infringement when a licensee exceeds time or media restric-
tions on his license-the need to allow the proprietor of the underlying copyright to
control the method in which his work is presented to the public-applies equally to the
situation in which a licensee makes an unauthorized use of the underlying work by
publishing it in a truncated version. Whether intended to allow greater economic ex-
ploitation of the work, as in the media and time cases, or to ensure that the copyright
proprietor retains a veto power over revisions desired for the derivative work, the abil-
ity of the copyright holder to control his work remains paramount in our copyright law.
We find, therefore, that unauthorized editing of the underlying work, if proven, would
constitute an infringement of the copyright in that work similar to any other use of a
work that exceeded the license granted by the proprietor of the copyright.
Id.
149. See id. at 26. The plaintiffs also brought a trademark infringement action under the Lan-
ham Act. Id.
150. 48 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
151. Id. at 299.
152. Id. at 310.
153. Id. at 300.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 305. The defendant asserted that he had no recollection of this encounter with the
plaintiff or of reviewing the plaintiffs work, Matchsticks. Hogan, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
156. Id. at 310.
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lical allusions; both characters were involved in new romances; both
characters sought the truth of their past; and both characters killed.157
Despite the similarities, the court held that these mirror elements
were merely "unprotectable ideas" and "scenes a faire"1 58 and, conse-
quently, granted the defendant summary judgment. 159
This final case would also likely hinder an indigenous group's quest
for copyright protection of its ancient legends and stories, many of
which incorporate the traditional struggles between good and evil.
However, indigenous groups suing in the United States may have a
final intellectual property route. They could attempt to use state law
claims, such as right of publicity, to protect the persona of current or
deceased tribal members.
D. Right of Publicity
Beyond federal trademark and copyright laws lies a legal regime
that may apply to disputes over the ownership of cultural heritage-
right of publicity. Unlike trademark and copyright law, the right of
publicity is not necessarily an intellectual property right. Instead, it is
defined as a "commercial tort which protects against the
(mis)appropriation of the commercial value of another's identity. ' 160
Thus, right of publicity laws protect one's right to exploit his or her
own public image commercially by barring others from doing so.
Right of publicity protection is a rapidly evolving common law right
derived from the right to privacy and unfair competition laws.161 Be-
cause the right of publicity is a descendent of right to privacy laws, it
has inherited the confusing history attached to the development of
privacy rights. 162 Scope of protection varies from state to state, ac-
cording to individual statutes.
157. Id.
158. COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 2:2.2 (Practicing Law Inst. ed., 2001).
Copyright protects expression, not ideas. This dichotomy between idea and expression is central
to the understanding of copyright law. It ensures that only the author's concrete contributions
will be protected. The raw pool of material from which to draw will not be depleted. Scenes a
faire are standard themes found in theatrical works and literature and belong to this pool of
ideas free for all to use. Basic examples of scenes a faire include star-crossed lovers, unrequited
love, the battle between good and evil, and a struggle to find one's real identity. More specific
plot lines also qualify as scenes a faire. Examples include friendly aliens (the film E. T. ), the theft
of nuclear weapons from a dilapidated Russian arsenal, the tale of a woman rejecting a man's
dominance, and the stock character of a sleazy music producer.
159. Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
160. JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHT IN PERSONA 14-15 (1996).
161. See GI.SON, supra note 30, § 1.03.
162. Id.
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The right of publicity protects people's investment in the develop-
ment of their personas, allowing them to exclude others from the use
of their name, likeness, and other recognizable attributes in commer-
cial contexts. 163 Usually, the right of publicity vests with celebrities;
however, anyone who attains fame or prominence through advertising
or news coverage may enjoy the right of publicity. 164 Upon the death
of one who enjoys right of publicity protection, that right could pass
on to his or her estate.165
According to one intellectual property expert, the right of publicity
is akin to trademark laws because both depend "to a great degree on
public recognition, perception, and association. ' 166 Both trademarks
and rights of publicity warrant similar remedies as well, giving rise to
injunctive relief and possible compensatory damages upon
violation.167
Below is a framework of right of publicity cases that sets the stage
for actions by both private individuals and public figures. This line of
cases establishes law that could work for either side in a cultural heri-
tage dispute. The first two cases could assist groups seeking right of
publicity protection for cultural heritage and the final two cases may
work against indigenous groups. 168
1. Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum169
In Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that the right of
publicity does not only pertain to privacy; it ties to one's financial in-
terest in the control of his persona. 170 The plaintiff contracted with
famous baseball players to use their likenesses to promote sales of its
chewing gum.171 The ball players agreed not to enter into any similar
agreements with advertisers; later, however, 'the defendant induced
the ball players' permission to use their photographs to sell Topps'
competing brand of chewing gum.1 72 As its defense, Topps applied
the traditional theory that only players, not the plaintiff, had standing
163. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 25, at 519-20.
164. See GILSON, supra note 30, § 1.03.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. It warrants mention that, in this particular instance, the facts of the hypothetical Maori/
LEGO dispute are particularly fluid and open to interpretation. It is exceedingly difficult to
accurately predict how a court might deal with this novel situation.
169. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
170. Id. at 868.
171. See id. at 866.
172. Id.
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to sue because the baseball players' privacy rights were personal, and
could not be assigned to someone else. 7 3
The Second Circuit rejected this defense and recognized that people
had the right to grant the use of their persona to others,174 creating a
right of publicity.175
2. Zacchini v. Scripps176
Zacchini v. Scripps also helped to set the stage for rights in one's
persona, image, and likeness. This United States Supreme Court case
pitted free speech rights against the right of publicity; the right of pub-
licity won.
The petitioner, Zacchini, was an entertainer who performed a
"human cannonball" act in which his body was launched from a can-
non into a net placed 200 feet away. 177 In 1972, a Burton, Ohio
county fair employed Zacchini to perform his act for members of the
public.178 A freelance reporter carried a small movie camera into the
fair grounds and, against Zacchini's wishes, taped the fifteen-second
"human cannonball" act.179 The entire fifteen-second clip of the per-
formance aired on the evening news with favorable commentary.180
Outraged, Zacchini brought a state law claim for unlawful appropria-
tion of his personal property. 18'
173. See id. at 867. The defendant argued that plaintiffs' claim had no merit:
The contract with plaintiff was no more than a release by the ball-player to plaintiff of
the liability which, absent the release, plaintiff would have incurred in using the ball-
player's photograph, because such a use, without his consent, would be an invasion of
his right of privacy under Section 50 and Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law;
this statutory right of privacy is personal, not assignable; therefore, plaintiff's contract
vested in plaintiff no 'property' right or other legal interest which defendant's conduct
invaded.
Id. The court rejected this contention. Id.
174. Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868. The court stated: "We think that, in addition to
and independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture." Id.
175. See also PINCKAERS, supra note 160, at 14. "The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nized the 'right of publicity' which not only consisted of the (negative) right to prohibit unautho-
rized commercial use of identity, but also of the (positive) right to grant exclusive rights to third
parties to exploit the licensor's identity." Id. (emphasis in original).
176. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
177. Id. at 563.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 564.
180. Id. The Commentary actually urged viewers to see the show in person, but this did not
bolster respondent's case.
181. Id.
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After winding its way through the Ohio court system, Zacchini
landed in the Supreme Court. After weighing the First Amendment
right to free speech of the media against a performer's "commercial
stake in his act, ' 182 the Court held that neither the First Amendment
nor the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
grants the media privilege to appropriate a performer's entire act,
damaging his commercial interests. 183  The Court clarified this
holding:
It is important to note that neither the public nor respondent will be
deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as long as his
commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized. Petitioner
does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply
wants to be paid for it. 184
3. Molony v. Boy Comics Publisher185
This 1950 New York case presents a barrier to groups utilizing the
right of publicity as a means to protect the use of indigenous public
figures. In Molony, a seventeen-year-old man serving in the United
States Coast Guard rushed to the rescue of several people when a
U.S. Army plane struck the Empire State Building. 86 The plaintiff
"displayed exceptional presence of mind in quickly procuring medical
equipment, and in evacuating a large number of victims, to many of
whom he administered first aid."'1 87
182. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. The Court differentiates between the two torts in question
here, the right to privacy and the right of publicity:
"The interest protected" in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light
"is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defama-
tion." By contrast, the State's interest in permitting a "right of publicity" is in protect-
ing the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such
entertainment. As we later note, the State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of
patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of
his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation. Second, the
two torts differ in the degree to which they intrude on dissemination of information to
the public. In "false light" cases the only way to protect the interests involved is to
attempt to minimize publication of the damaging matter, while in "right of publicity"
cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing. An entertainer such as peti-
tioner usually has no objection to the widespread publication of his act as long as he
gets the commercial benefit of such publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner
did not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his act; he simply sought compensation for the
broadcast in the form of damages.
Id. (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 575.
184. Id. at 578.
185. 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1980).
186. Id. at 121.
187. Id.
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The event captured America's attention, making Americans wonder
what could happen if our cities were subject to attacks from the air.188
Several media covered the plaintiff's role in the rescue, launching him
into the spotlight.'8 9 Six months later, the defendant published Boy
Comics, which depicted the Empire State Building accident, labeling
the plaintiff "Real Hero."'190 Depictions of the plaintiff showed him
procuring first aid supplies from a drugstore, aiding an elevator opera-
tor with severe burns, climbing to the seventy-ninth floor, and carry-
ing out victims to safety. 191
The soldier objected to the unauthorized commercialization of his
likeness and filed suit under the New York Civil Rights Law sections
50 and 51,192 which forbade the use of one's name, portrait, or picture
without his consent for advertising purposes or use in trade. 193 While
the court held that the pictorial depiction was essentially accurate, the
defendant's account did not constitute advertising or use in trade. 94
The court held for the defendant publisher, dismissing the plaintiff's
188. Id. at 120-21.
189. Id. at 121.
190. Id.
191. Molony, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 121. The court described defendant's publication in detail:
This action springs from an account of this incident with accompanying drawings, which
appeared some six months later in a magazine published by defendant, entitled "Boy
Comics." It occupies five pages of an issue containing various series of pictures, and is
headed "The True Story of the Empire State Building," beneath which are the capital-
ized words "REAL HERO." The script is taken almost verbatim from the news ac-
count as it appeared in the New York Journal-American. The pictures are not actual
photographs, but the usual type of drawings or symbolic sketches which are found in
such publications. The first pictures are of a four-motored bombing plane crashing into
the Empire State Building, followed by an illustrated narrative of plaintiff's deeds. He
is shown procuring morphine, hypodermics, and first-aid kits from a drugstore, giving
first aid to an elevator girl who sustained severe burns and had descended rapidly from
the 79th floor, then shown climbing the stairs to the 79th floor while the elevators were
disabled, and then carrying out survivors and again administering first aid. The narra-
tive culminates in plaintiff's being congratulated by survivors and photographed and
interviewed by newsmen and, finally, in his being recommended by the Coast Guard
for a decoration.
Id.
192. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1950). The relevant portion of the stat-
ute states:
§ 50. Right of privacy
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of
trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained
the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
193. New York had no common-law right to privacy. Molony, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
194. Id. at 124-26.
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claim. 195 If a defendant were, however, using the disputed likeness in
a plainly commercial context, a plaintiff may have a better case. 196
4. Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys1 97
In this case, the plaintiff lost his right of publicity claim against a
defendant toy maker. The plaintiff was a "fringe actor" who played
supporting roles in several motion pictures, including the 1987 film
Predator, in which he played Billy, the Native American Tracker.198
The defendant toy maker contracted in 1995 to market a line of toys
based on Predator, including a Billy toy.199 The plaintiff objected to
the Billy toy, claiming the toy violated his right of publicity under
Kentucky law.20 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explored
the question of when the character's identity fuses with the actor's
identity, vesting the right of publicity with the individual actor.201 The
court held that "if the use of a fictional character also evokes the
identity of the actor who played the character, he may challenge that
use, '20 2 even if that actor gained fame only through his performance
of that role.20 3 However, in applying this rule to the case, the court
held that the actor's identity and the character's identity were sepa-
rate and distinct. 20 4 The court reached this pro-defendant decision
even though the use in question was clearly commercial and, conse-
quently, subject to a higher level of scrutiny.20 5
195. Id. at 126.
196. The principles of this case could work for the Maori if a U.S. court were to deem the
Bionicle game mainly commercial. In Molony, the comic book coverage arguably had 'some
newsworthiness.
197. 227 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000).
198. Id. at 621.
199. Id. at 622.
200. Id. Plaintiff also claimed the doll violated the Lanham Act's prohibition of false
endorsements.
201. Id. at 625.
202. Landham, 227 F.3d at 625.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 626. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument:
In sum, Landham has not demonstrated-either through direct evidence or by virtue of
Galoob's use of the "Billy" character-that his persona has "significant commercial
value" or that the "Billy" toy invokes his own persona, as distinct from that of the
fictional character. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Defendants on this claim.
Id.
205. LEGO's use of Maori elements in the Bionicle game could likely be deemed commercial
as well. However, this case evidences that commercial use will not always result in a finding for
the plaintiff.
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Both Haelan Laboratories and Zacchini strengthen the right of pub-
licity regime by first recognizing a right to one's persona and then
recognizing the right to license that right of publicity. However,
Molony shrinks the rights of public figures by allowing depictions of
actual events, and Landham refuses an actor rights to his character's
persona. These right of publicity cases exemplify the fractured nature
of the law in this area. This common law action, although tenuous,
could provide ammunition to indigenous groups in a battle over cul-
tural heritage if the element in controversy is a persona.
III. ANALYSIS: SQUARING U.S. TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT, AND
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY LAWS WITH THE PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL HERITAGE
The outline of U.S. case law above provides the framework for ana-
lyzing the Maori's potential legal claims against LEGO. This ground-
work provides some understanding of U.S. practice regarding the
protection of intangible cultural property and allows one to gauge fu-
ture legal trends in the cultural heritage area. This section will first
detail the dispute between New Zealand's indigenous tribes and the
Danish toy maker. Next, it will set out some possible Maori legal
claims under trademark, copyright, and right of publicity regimes, an-
alyzing each one's likelihood of success based on U.S. case law and
trends.
A. LEGO's Bionicle Game and the Maori Objections
The hi-tech Bionicle line combines toys, online games, and
comics 20 6 to create an interactive game for children. LEGO
researched several cultures and their histories, including Polynesian
culture, to create the rich background for this complex game.207 Bion-
icle games center around an island, Mata Nui, that was once a beauti-
ful paradise, but is now a "place of darkness and fear ruled by the
deadly Makuta. ' '20 8 Six heroes, the Toa, have joined forces to fight the
Makuta and free the Matoran, the inhabitants of Mata Nui.20 9
206. Lego to Change Bionicle Names: Cultural Exploitation? (Oct. 31, 2001), at http://www.
icv2.com/articles/news/840.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
207. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
208. See LEGO website, at http://www.lego.com/engfbionicle/games.asp (last visited Nov. 15,
2003). The LEGO website has an extensive lexicon to define each character, name, place, and
object in the Bionicle line. LEGO continues to develop the game, adding new story lines and
products.
209. Id.
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The Matoran did not always go by that name. According to
LEGO's online lexicon, these Mata Nui inhabitants were previously
called the "Tohunga. ' '210 Tohunga is a sacred Maori word that loosely
translates to "priest. '211 The first generation of the Bionicle game em-
ployed other words found in the Maori language as well: Pohatu
(stone), Kanohi (mask), and Whenua (earth). 212
This Bionicle backdrop arguably incorporates elements of Polyne-
sian legend and history.213 Specifically, LEGO focused on the strug-
gle surrounding Easter Island, Rapa Nui in Maori,214 whose name
resembles "Mata Nui," LEGO's name for the island paradise at the
center of the Bionicle game. According to one news article: "The
vowel-laden names of the Bionicle characters are clearly reminiscent
of Polynesian names and the elemental (earth, fire, water, stone, air)
nature of the characters also relates to the spiritual beliefs of Pacific
210. See LEGO website, at http://www.lego.comleng/bionicle/lexicon.asp?contid=sz (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2003) (LEGO's online lexicon defines "Tohunga" as the villagers of the island of
Mata Nui, who now call themselves Matoran.).
211. Lego to Change Bionicle Names: Cultural Exploitation?, supra note 205.
212. Id. The definitions in the LEGO lexicon match the Maori meanings for these words:
"Kanohi: The masks worn by the inhabitants of Mata Nui; Whenua: Turaga of Onu-Koro;
Pohatu: The Toa of Stone." Id.
213. See generally Peter Wood, Toy Wars: Just Another Victim, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 21,
2001), at http://www.nationalreview.com/CommentlComment-woodprintl12101.html (last visited
July 23, 2003). While critiquing Maori's intellectual property claims, Wood summarizes Maori
history:
When Captain Cook arrived in New Zealand in 1769, he encountered a native people
fierce in temperament and experts in the arts of war. The various tribes had no com-
mon name for themselves, but in contrast to their increasingly frequent European visi-
tors, they saw themselves as normal - "maori"- and the word stuck.
The Maori had never been peaceful folk and some of them caught on quickly to the
possible opportunities latent in European technology. In 1820, a Maori named Hongi
Hika visited England where he was feted at Cambridge, received by King George IV,
and sent home laden with gifts. He returned to New Zealand via Australia, wherle he
had thoughtfully exchanged the English presents for muskets, and then Honga Hika
unleashed a bloody new kind of warfare among the Maori. Other tribes joined the
arms race, and the later Maori Wars (1845-47, 1860-61, 1863-64, and 1864-72) pitted
land-hungry European colonists against increasingly sophisticated native opponents. In
the last of these wars, a prophet, Te Ua Haumene, stirred the Maori to a desperate
attempt to drive the Europeans out. He killed his own son to expiate his own lapses
from the Maori way and inspired a fearless group of warriors known as the Hauhau.
Their efforts were soon supplemented by another religiously inspired guerilla leader, Te
Kooti.
The Maori, however, at last learned that armed resistance didn't pay. Te Kooti laid
down his guns and reformulated traditional Maori religion into a gentler creed called
Ringatu, focused on faith healing.
Id.
214. CNN, Maori Challenge Lego over Use of Culture (June 1, 2001), available at http://www.
cnn.com/200/lWORLD/asiapcf/auspacO6IOl/newzealand.maorilindex.html (last visited July 23,
2003).
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Islanders."21 5 LEGO admits to studying Polynesian culture while de-
veloping the game, and to being inspired by it.216 However, LEGO
asserts that its historians explored the history and lore of several cul-
tures to create the Bionicle line:
LEGO Company's new product Bionicle (a contraction of the
words 'Biology' + 'Chronicle') has evolved through inspiration from
many different cultures and places around the world. In the Bion-
icle universe there are words with specific meaning to Maori, Kore-
ans, Rotuman Islanders, Moroccans, Chinese, Japanese and even
speakers of ancient Cornish in Great Britain. Other words are
purely fictional simply chosen for their feel. The Bionicle story and
characters have been created to represent heroism, bravery and in-
spiration for children in their play with and enjoyment of the
products. 217
The New Zealand-based barrister on the frontline of this debate,
Maui Solomon, states that the Maori object to LEGO's misuse of both
Polynesian language and culture. 21 8 Specifically, the Maori challenge
the use of Maori and other Polynesian names on plastic LEGO toys,
the use of sacred Maori words, such as Tohunga (priest), and the Ma-
ori names being used "outside their cultural context. ' 219 Maui Solo-
mon drafted a letter of complaint to LEGO in May 2001,220 asking for
the suspension of the Bionicle line because it infringed the Polynesian
peoples' intellectual property rights to their language and culture. 221
After receiving the letter, LEGO reconsidered its game; however, it
did not suspend sales or recall any Bionicle merchandise. 222 Instead,
LEGO agreed not to use any Maori words in later Bionicle genera-
tions.223 Considering that LEGO believed the Maori claims had no
legal merit, agreeing to this revision, was a major concession, albeit far
less expensive than a product recall.
215. Lego to Change Bionicle Names: Cultural Exploitation?, supra note 205.
216. E-mail from Jette Orduna, LEGO, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul University College
of Law (Oct. 25, 2002, 12:09:38 CST) (on file with author).
217. See id.
218. E-mail from Maui Solomon, New Zealand Barrister, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul
University College of Law (Nov. 11, 2002, 10:59:13 CST) (on file with author).
219. Id.
220. E-Mail from Maui Solomon, New Zealand Barrister, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul
University College of Law (Nov. 11, 2002, 10:25:51 CST) (on file with author).
221. CNN, supra note 213.
222. E-mail from Jette Orduna, LEGO. to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul University College
of Law (Nov. 8, 2002, 09:03:21 CST) (on file with author). LEGO stated that it was "too late and
impossible to recall all the products and marketing materials, which had been distributed world-
wide." Id. Further, LEGO claims not to view this matter as a legal one; instead it sees it as a
sentimental issue only. Id.
223. Id.
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Below, the next section analyzes the Maori's possible intellectual
property claims against LEGO in U.S. courts, if indeed the Maori
chose to sue. By looking through the narrow lens created by the Ma-
ori challenges to LEGO's Bionicle line, we can explore the broader
issues of all cultural heritage disputes and how they might fare under
U.S. law.
B. Possible Trademark Claims
When seeking protection for cultural heritage, specifically for the
Maori words incorporated into Bionicle, the Maori may turn to the
Lanham Act.224 It is important to note that LEGO has not attempted
to trademark any word or symbol in the Bionicle line, except for the
"Bionicle" name itself.225 Bionicle, as noted above, combines the
words "biology" and "chronicle" to form a new word,226 which would
likely qualify as either "suggestive" or "arbitrary" on the accepted
U.S. scale of trademark eligibility.227
In their hypothetical lawsuit against LEGO, the Maori have two
high hurdles to clear before gaining trademark protection for words in
the Maori language. They must (1) establish that common words in
their language are eligible for trademark protection,228 and (2) prove
that LEGO's use of Maori words is likely to cause consumer
confusion. 229
1. Generic Names are Not Subject to Trademark Protection
Random words in any language, which do not signal the specific
source of a product or service, do not meet the threshold for tr~ide-
mark protection, according to the basic principles of trademark law. 230
A word must "designate the source or origin of a particular product or
224. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000). The Lanham Act protects marks used in
trade or commerce. The Maori may have to first establish that they had been trading on the
names themselves to establish a valid trademark claim.
225. E-mail from Jette Orduna, LEGO, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul University College
of Law (Oct. 25, 2002, 12:09:38 CST) (on file with author).
226. Id.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34. BIONICLE is a strong candidate for trade-
mark protection in the United States. First, it is clearly not the generic term for a specific service
object. Next, it does not simply describe the characteristics or attributes of the game. The term
may be considered suggestive; one could argue that it connotes the game's epic, historical nature.
More likely, however, BIONICLE would be deemed arbitrary and worthy of the highest level of
trademark protection because BIONICLE is a novel term created by combining two separate
words, biology and chronicle.
228. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(3)(A).
229. Id. § 1051(b)(3)(D).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
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service" 231 before it will be considered for trademark protection. The
words employed by LEGO in developing the Bionicle line, Pohatu,
Kanohi, and Whenua232 translate to the generic words, "stone,"
"mask," and "earth" respectively.233 According to one trademark ex-
pert, a generic name is:
The name of a particular genus or class of things or a member of
such a class. It is denominative in character, is ordinarily a noun,
and answers the questions "What is it?" or "What do you call it?"
Thus, "piano" is the generic name for one member of a class of
keyboard instruments.2 34
The Maori words above meet this definition of "generic names."
Generic names are essential to communication and, therefore, must
be free for all to use. No one person or group may rightfully corner a
generic name as an exclusive trademark. Usually, generic names, such
as the Maori words embedded in LEGO's Bionicle game, are not eli-
gible for trademark protection.235
Yet, it is important to note that generic terms are not eligible for
trademark protection only when they are designed to signal the corre-
sponding generic term.236 ORANGE, for example, would be ineligi-
ble for trademark protection to signal the actual fruit because it is the
widely accepted generic term for that item. If the ORANGE mark
signifies a mobile phone company; however, it could be registrable.2 37
This indicates that LEGO could succeed in registering some Maori
words if it chose to pursue that route. For example, the WHENUA
mark may be registrable if it signaled something other than earth in
the Bionicle universe, such as a warrior princess. If LEGO did regis-
ter a Maori term for an element of the Bionicle game, LEGO would
not control every use of the Maori word. 238 It would own rights to the
Maori word only in the context of the Bionicle game. 239
231. GILSON, supra note 30, § 2.02.
232. Lego to Change Bionicle Names: Cultural Exploitation?, supra note 205.
233. See id.
234. GILSON, supra note 30, § 2.02, at 13-14.
235. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (holding that "shredded wheat" was
a generic, descriptive term to which plaintiff cereal producer held no exclusive rights).
236. GILSON, supra note 30, § 2.02.
237. See Orange Phones U.K. website, at http://www.orange-phones.co.uk/ (last visited Nov.
15, 2003). A cellular phone company in the United Kingdom bears the ORANGE trademark.
Id.
238. GILSON, supra note 30, § 2.02.
239. Id.
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2. Generic Terms in a Foreign Language May Still Be Deemed
Generic
The trademark inquiry goes even one step further in this case be-
cause the words that are generic in the Maori language are novel to
most American consumers, who are not familiar with Polynesian lan-
guages. Nonetheless, trademark law does not afford foreign generic
words greater protection. 240 United States law equates the foreign
word with its English translation and inquires "whether it would be
generic to members of the American public familiar with the foreign
language."'241 In this case, the words "stone," "mask," and "earth" are
clearly generic names, yet they are not necessarily used to signal the
corresponding object. Therefore, the Maori words found in Bionicle
may be eligible for trademark protection under the Lanham Act.
Even though the trademark case law outlined above dictates that
generic words are not eligible for protection, this does not preclude
LEGO from gaining trademark rights to some Maori words used in
the Bionicle game. When the courts refused protection above, it was
because the marks signaled their generic counterparts. For example,
in Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut v. Mohegan Tribe and Na-
tion, Inc.,242 the court refused to protect the MOHEGAN mark be-
cause it was a generic term used to describe a people of certain
ancestry.243 Both the plaintiffs and the defendants were utilizing a
word outside of the English language to signal a source, their tribes,
and their associated business endeavors.
In both Filipino Yellow Pages244 and the dispute regarding
OTOKOYAMA sake, 245 the courts supported the rule that foreign ge-
neric or descriptive words did not warrant trademark protection
when used to signal the corresponding generic goods or services. 246 In
the hypothetical Maori v. LEGO dispute, however, the Maori words
240. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965) (refusing to grant
exclusive rights to the generic names of foreign games or to the games themselves in a dispute
revolving around the "Yo-Yo").
241. GILSON, supra note 30, § 2.02[4]. Gilson highlights other cases in which foreign generic
terms were not protected under U.S. law, such as KABA for "coffee" to those familiar with
Ukrainian and the Cyrillic alphabet, or LECHE DE MAGNESIA, which translates to "milk of
magnesia" in Spanish. Id.
242. 769 A.2d 34 (Conn. 2001).
243. Id. at 42.
244. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.
1999).
245. See Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 1999).
246. Id. at 271.
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employed are names of the game pieces. They could be considered
descriptive, 247 yet they are certainly not generic.
3. LEGO's Use of Generic Maori Terms is Unlikely to Cause
Consumer Confusion
Trademark law focuses on consumers' perceptions. If a mark is
likely to confuse the public as to the source or the origin of a good or
service, a merchant may not register that trademark.248 The test for
consumer confusion is defined in the Lanham Act. It is unlawful to
use any trademark that "is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by an-
other person .... ",249
In this case, LEGO claims to have employed Maori words, along
with other fictional words, because their look and "feel" comport with
the epic style of the Bionicle game.25 0 A thorough exploration of the
Bionicle website reveals no direct connection to the Maori or to any
Polynesian people beyond the use of some words that have specific
meaning in the Maori language.251 The majority of LEGO consum-
ers252 are not familiar with Polynesian languages and would likely not
be able to pinpoint the origin of the vowel-laden words. Conse-
quently, consumers are unlikely to connect the Maori to the Bionicle
game at all. This lack of association in the minds of consumers rules
out a likelihood of consumer confusion.
4. Maori Claims Under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Immoral,
Deceptive, or Scandalous Marks
To reiterate, LEGO has not attempted to register any words in the
Bionicle universe beyond the game's name, nor does LEGO plan to
247. For example, if "Pohatu" signaled a Bionicle character with a stone body, it should be
deemed descriptive and granted a very narrow scope of protection.
248. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Lack of registrability does not necessarily
preclude the use of a mark.
249. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
250. E-mail from Jette Orduna, LEGO, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul University College
of Law (Oct. 25, 2002, 12:09:38 CST) (on file with author).
251. LEGO website, at http://www.lego.com/englbionicle/default.asp (last visited Nov. 15,
2003). The LEGO website makes no mention of the Maori people or the Polynesian history or
culture.
252. Both sophisticated parents and unsophisticated children comprise LEGO's target con-
sumer group. However, LEGO sells its products throughout the world. It is unreasonable to
assume that the majority of its consumers would be familiar with the Maori language.
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pursue trademark protection for game words in any country.253 How-
ever, if LEGO did attempt to trademark a toy's name, such as the
"Tohunga" toy from the first generation of the Bionicle line, the Ma-
ori may be able to bar registration under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act,
which prohibits immoral, deceptive, or scandalous marks.
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.254 acts as a guide to a § 2(a) objection.
Again, in that case, American Indians successfully enjoined the regis-
tration of any form of REDSKIN due to its disparaging nature. 255 In
this present debate, the Maori are particularly upset by LEGO's use
of the term Tohunga for a plastic toy.256 The Maori attorney, Maui
Solomon, said that his clients specifically objected to the offensive use
of this sacred term, which means "priest. '257
To establish a § 2(a) claim, the Maori must lay the groundwork for
how LEGO's use of Tohunga is immoral, deceptive, or scandalous, or
could disparage a people. 258 In Maori culture, language is central to
the Maori way and to preserving one's tribal identity, known as the
Mdoritanga.2 59 One Maori artist explains the role language plays in
the Maori world:
First, in understanding that language is the key to understanding
any culture, I make sure that I speak my language in as many places
as possible and pass this on to my children. I want them to learn
their language and to know who their ancestors are, their tribal his-
tories, as well as the customs and traditions we have. Knowledge of
my language enables me to move comfortably amidst my people
and to participate more fully... The Maori language is the lifeblood
of our culture.260
Second, the Maori must establish the sacred place of Tohunga in
their culture, which is exemplified by a Maori fable. The birth of life,
according to Maori culture, began with Ranginui, the Sky Father, and
Papatuanuku, the Earth Mother, clinging together in a tight em-
brace.261 Their many children were crushed between the two bodies,
yearning for freedom and struggling to break loose.262 Many children-
253. E-mail from Jette Orduna, LEGO, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul University College
of Law (Oct. 25, 2002, 12:09:38 CST) (on file with author).
254. 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999). See supra notes 40-55. See also addendum
as Harjo was recently reversed.
255. Id. at 1749.
256. E-mail from Maui Solomon, Maori Attorney, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law (Nov. 11, 2002. 10:59:13 + 1300) (on file with author).
257. See id.
258. See supra note 48 and the accompanying text.
259. MAORI: ART AND CULTURE 162 (D.C. Starzecka ed., 1996).
260. Id. at 56.
261. Id. at 26.
262. Id.
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gods used their powers and strength in desperate attempts to separate
their parents and liberate their siblings.263 All failed, save one, Tdne
Mahuta, the god of the forests.264 He "set his sturdy feet upon his
father's chest, and braced his upper back and shoulders against the
bosom of his mother. He pushed and they parted. '265 His siblings
tumbled forth and so the world began. 266
This story illustrates the Maori ties to nature and the divine. The
Maori spiritual beliefs are elemental, savoring earth, wind, fire, and
water.267 The bridge between the divine and the human is paramount
and the Tohunga, (priests), facilitate this sacred synapse by managing
tapu (under religious restriction, sacred) and mana (power, prestige,
authority) .268
LEGO used the term "Tohunga" to refer to general island inhabi-
tants in the first release of the Bionicle game. 269 In light of the pivotal
and sacred role of the Tohunga in Maori religion and culture, creating
a plastic children's toy with this name "may disparage" the Maori peo-
ple, as REDSKIN was held to be possibly disparaging to Native
Americans in Harjo. Therefore, the Maori may be able to block
LEGO under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act if the toy maker had at-
tempted to register TOHUNGA as a trademark for its Bionicle
pieces. This conclusion loses its punch, however, because LEGO has
never attempted to register any words in the game and has stated that
it will never do so.270 Further, cancellation of a trademark registra-
tion, as established in Part II of this Comment, prohibits only exclu-
sive rights to that word; one may still use the term freely. The
Washington Redskins football team still exists today. The team own-
ers have lost only the right to license and control the mark.271 There-
fore, LEGO would still be free to use the Tohunga toy, rendering any
Maori § 2(a) efforts moot.272
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. MAORI: ART AND CULTURE, supra note 259, at 26.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 162.
268. Id. at 26, 161-62.
269. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
270. E-mail from Jette Orduna, LEGO, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul University College
of Law (Oct. 25, 2002, 12:09:38 CST) (on file with author).
271. Losing the right to license the REDSKINS mark likely resulted in a substantial loss of
potential revenue for the team owners.
272. Further, other entities could also freely use the term "Tohunga" to market goods and
services. No one entity, including the Maori, would own exclusive rights to the term. This result
would invert the essential Maori purpose.
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Finally, it is key to note that LEGO has attempted to lessen injury
and insult to the Maori by changing the name of the island inhabitants
from the Tohunga to the Matoran, a name with no specific meaning in
the Maori language.2 73
This analysis of the theoretical legal battle between the Maori and
LEGO reveals that U.S. trademark law is unlikely to provide the Ma-
ori with effective legal ammunition. Another possible route lies in the
copyright regime.
C. Possible Maori Copyright Action: Unlikely to Succeed
The Maori have objected most fervently to LEGO's inappropriate
use of specific words from the Maori language in the Bionicle line;
however, these theoretical plaintiffs are also upset that the Bionicle
story line resembles Maori history and lore. 274 Maui Solomon, the
Maori attorney leading this opposition, alleges that the Bionicle
"storyline [sic] bore 'a remarkable resemblance' to traditional yarns
from Easter Island. '275 Consequently, the Maori might raise copy-
right claims in this hypothetical legal action for protection of their cul-
tural heritage.
First, it is not clear that LEGO based the epic Bionicle game on the
evocative, war-torn Maori history or legends.276 To facilitate this por-
tion of the analysis, however, we will assume Bionicle draws heavily
from Maori past and legend, specifically the battle over Rapa Nui, or
Easter Island.
1. Maori History and Legends Do Not Qualify for Copyright
Protection
As established in Part II, the three fundamental requirements for
U.S. copyright protection: (1) originality; (2) authorship; and (3) fixa-
tion,2 77 clash with the oral cultures of indigenous tribes. Therefore, it
may be difficult for the Maori to succeed in copyright claims against
LEGO for the use of Maori language, history, or legend in the Bion-
icle game.
273. See LEGO website, at http://www.lego.com/eng/bionicle/games.asp (last visited Nov. 15,
2003).
274. Andrew Osbourne. Maoris Win LEGO Battle, GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4288446,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
275. See id. (quoting Maui Solomon).
276. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (outlining some of the Maori history, past
leaders, and wars.).
277. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
2003]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Originality and authorship are high hurdles for the Maori in this
instance. There is no one "author" of Maori legends detailing the epic
battles to protect Rapa Nui, just as in Western culture, where there is
no identifiable author to the legends of Santa Claus or the Easter
Bunny. These stories are often based on a kernel of truth and evolve
over time. This intergenerational evolution weakens claims of origi-
nality, often making copyright protection unattainable. Further, these
stories have been passed down orally, without fixation in a "tangible
medium of expression, ' 278 as required by the Copyright Act.
Even if these Maori stories were fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression and the group could establish authorship and originality,
their protection would have expired. Copyright protection is finite.
After the adoption of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act,279 works are protected for only seventy years after the death of
the author before they enter the public domain.2 0 The last Maori
War ended in 1872, 131 years ago.28' This time frame suggests that
fictional accounts of the wars would not be subject to current copy-
right protection, unless they were created within seventy years and
met the rigorous copyright standards laid out above.
One renowned expert in the field of copyright, David Nimmer, ex-
pounds on the issue of copyrighting historical accounts: "One cannot
build a story around a historical incident and then claim exclusive
right in the use of the incident. 282 Allowing exclusive rights to histori-
cal events would rob the public domain of vital information, excluding
later authors from retelling an event in a different manner.
Nimmer also explains why courts deny protection to such facts:
"Facts may be discovered, but they are not created by an act of au-
thorship. One who discovers an otherwise unknown fact may well
have performed a socially useful function, but the discovery as such
does iot render him an 'author' in either the constitutional or statu-
tory sense. '283
This refusal to grant copyrights in facts, however, does not leave all
factual works vulnerable to blatant copying. Copyright laws do pro-
tect the original expression, the manner in which the facts are related,
if they are not functional (i.e., a graph or a table). 284 Therefore, if
278. Id.
279. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 505, 11 Stat. 2827 (1998).
280. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 111, § 9.01.
281. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
282. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 111, § 2.11.
283. See id. To summarize, finders are not keepers in the realm of copyright law.
284. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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LEGO had appropriated a Maori storyteller's expression of a legend,
including his original contributions, the Maori may have a valid copy-
right action. Note that, even if LEGO did base Bionicle loosely on
Maori legend or factual history, it would not rise to this level of
copying.
2. Comparing Hypothetical Maori Claims to Established Copyright
Case Law
This conclusion that the Maori have little hope to succeed in a copy-
right action follows the case law highlighted in Part II. In Fendler v.
Morosco,285 the court refused to protect general "ideas" common to
two separate plays.2 86 Just like in Fendler, the "ideas" that comprise
Maori legends are not protected by copyright.
In Malkin v. Dubinsky,28 7 another playwright lost the battle to pro-
tect his play, which was based on family drama within the context of a
union strike.2 88 The court recognized similarities, as well as differ-
ences, between the two plays,289 concluding that incidents extracted
from the public domain are not copyrightable. 290 The themes running
through Maori legends, which include a battle to protect one's home-
land, war, complicated love, and pride, are also basic ideas in the pub-
lic domain. These scenes a faire291 do not warrant protection. In
Hogan v. DC Comics, 29 2 the court found no copyright infringement
where two similar comic books contained central half-vampire, half-
human characters of the same name.293
Finally, in the realm of copyright, the Maori could claim that
LEGO's portrayal of Polynesian history perverts the real story and,
therefore, constitutes copyright infringement.294 In Gilliam v. ABC,
Inc., the authors of the Monty Python series succeeded on copyright
grounds because ABC edited the Monty Python programs inappropri-
ately, mutilating the plaintiff's copyrighted work.295 In the instant
case, however, the Maori do not hold copyrights to the legends and
285. Fendler v. Morosco, 171 N.E. 56, 61 (N.Y. 1930).
286. See id.
287. 203 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 507. "In the case at bar, plaintiff's claims involve, at best, some similar material
which belongs to the public domain and some details which in the total context are trivial." Id.
290. Id. at 506.
291. COPYRIGHT LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 158, § 2:2.2.
292. Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
293. Id. at 313.
294. Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
295. See id.
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history that may have inspired the Bionicle backdrop. This lack of
copyright precludes this course of action.
After exhausting the copyright route, the Maori could next seek re-
dress under right of publicity laws.
D. Possible Strategies Based on Right of Publicity Laws
Beyond naming the cowed inhabitants of Mata Nui the "Tohunga"
in the first version of the Bionicle game, LEGO referenced no actual
Maori historical figures. If LEGO had built its Bionicle story around
a revered Maori warrior, the Maori may have had a strong right of
publicity claim, provided LEGO's use detracted from Maori plans to
capitalize on that warrior persona. LEGO did not pursue this avenue,
and therefore, a right of publicity exploration will be brief. For the
purposes of legal analysis that could aid the debate over control of
cultural heritage, we will assume that LEGO did incorporate the story
of "Mana King," a purely fictional Maori warrior figure created for
this Comment only, into the Bionicle story line through the LEGO
website, comics, and plastic toys. Using this assumption, one can ana-
lyze the Maori's theoretical claims against the right of publicity case
law set forth in Part II.
1. General Right of Publicity Analysis
If Mana King had died, the rights in his persona might have passed
down to his heirs through his estate, as right of publicity laws can be
descendible. 296 His estate may then have standing to sue LEGO in
the U.S. court system if LEGO consumers would be likely to incor-
rectly believe that Mana King or his estate somehow supported or
endorsed LEGO's Bionicle product line.297 Before winning a right of
publicity claim, the Maori would have to establish a connection in the
consumer mind between the LEGO game and their revered warrior,
Mana King.
When analyzing right of publicity cases, courts might first look back
to the landmark case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,298 which dealt
with right of privacy as opposed to right of publicity, yet still provides
guidance. This libel case restricted privacy rights for public figures by
requiring that plaintiffs establish that false statements or misuse of
296. See GILSON, supra note 30, § 1.03.
297. See generally Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). Again,
note that for the purposes of this Comment, standing in the United States is assumed. In reality,
however, the issue of standing for the Maori would be a complex issue that would address sev-
eral topics, including whether the Maori could win collective standing or class status.
298. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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their persona resulted from the defendant's actual malice. 299 Right of
publicity analysis parallels this idea that even though public figures
have vested rights in their persona, they must endure certain invasions
due to their elevated societal status.300
When analyzing a right of publicity claim, the courts ask first
whether the medium in which the reference to the public figure ap-
peared is commercial or noncommercial. 301 Purely commercial
speech is afforded less protection because it is assumed to be less wor-
thy to the public discourse. 30 2 Next, a court determines whether the
publication at issue intended to create a false impression in the minds
of the audience. 30 3 The question of actual malice, as presented in Sul-
livan, rarely arises in right of publicity claims because defendants
often have attempted only to imply sponsorship and have not made
express statements about the public figure. 30 4 The concept of actual
malice is better suited to right to privacy issues.
In the situation of Mana King's appearance in LEGO's Bionicle
line, courts likely would hold that the game was not purely commer-
cial speech. Mana King's fictional presence in the game as a character
adds depth and value to the story. The fact that the game is a commer-
cial work for sale in the marketplace, as opposed to a nonprofit histor-
ical commentary, does not strip it of all free speech rights. Courts are
aware of the careful balance between the right of publicity, the First
Amendment, and intellectual property laws. 30 5
The next step in a right of publicity analysis is to ask whether con-
sumers are likely to incorrectly assume Mana King or his estate en-
dorsed the Bionicle game. The question mirrors trademark notions of
299. See id. Specifically, this case centered on libel-damaging false statements against a per-
son. Id. The court defined actual malice as knowledge that the statement made was false or that
it was made with reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 280.
300. While right of publicity laws are linked to right to privacy laws, and similar reasoning is
employed to comprehend both, the two realms are opposite. In right to privacy cases, people are
fighting to preserve their privacy and to keep their actions out of the public eye. In right of
publicity cases, plaintiffs court publicity, yet they are seeking to exclude others from also exploit-
ing their persona in a commercial context. Right of publicity plaintiffs want to be the only entity
controlling the commercial aspects of their persona.
301. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying
well-known actor Dustin Hoffman's assertions to his right of publicity when a magazine used an
altered photograph of him in women's clothing during a commentary on female clothing and
style).
302. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
303. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186.
304. Id.
305. See id. at 1184.
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likelihood of confusion.30 6 If Mana King was the hub of the Bionicle
game, consumers may very likely be confused and believe that his es-
tate endorsed the game, which would buttress the Maori's right of
publicity claims under a sponsorship confusion theory.30 7 However, if
Mana King was only one of many characters, confusion as to Mana
King's or Maori sponsorship would be less likely. Below is a case-by-
case analysis of how Maori right of publicity claims might fare in light
of the case law outlined in Part II.
2. Case Law Application to the Hypothetical Situation of
Mana King
The early right of publicity case mentioned previously, Haelan Lab-
oratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 30 8 reinforces the rights of Mana
King's estate to bring action against LEGO. According to the Second
Circuit, people have the right to grant the use of their persona to
others,30 9 which implies that one may bar others from using that per-
sona without permission. This holding bolsters the claims of Mana
King's estate, assuming LEGO idolized this warrior without
permission.
The landmark Zacchini v. Scripps3 10 right of publicity decision held
that people have the right to profit from use of their persona.311 This
Supreme Court ruling aids Mana King's estate. The estate could ar-
306. See GILtSON, supra note 30, § 5.05. Gilson demonstrates how courts review likelihood of
confusion when the plaintiff's and the defendant's goods do not necessarily compete in the same
market. This trademark analysis sheds light on the issues of source confusion and helps to ex-
plain how a court may embark on this complicated analysis in a right of publicity context:
§ 5.05 Noncompeting Products
Direct product competition is an important factor in assessing public confusion, but a
trademark owner may prevail by showing that the respective products are so related
that the public believes they come from a single source. In analyzing noncompeting
goods trademark cases, courts often consider a list of factors developed from prior case
law. Important factors in the determination of whether to extend protection are: (1) the
fame of the owner's trademark; (2) the strength of the mark; (3) whether the respective
products are of the same genus; and (4) whether the owner is likely to expand his
business to produce the noncompeting product. Consumer confusion may also be asso-
ciated with tarnishment of the trademark owner's product, by derogatory use of the
mark, or by association with inferior products.
Id.
307. To illustrate, an actor would have a strong sponsorship confusion claim if a vitamin man-
ufacturer were to place the actor's image on vitamin bottles or in the advertisements without
permission. Consumers would naturally (and mistakenly) draw a connection between the actor
and the product, concluding that the actor endorsed the product when in fact he did not.
308. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
309. Id. at 869.
310. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
311. Id. at 578.
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gue, for example, that it deserves compensation, under Zacchini, for
use of the warrior's image in the Bionicle game. To justify compensa-
tion, the estate could argue that LEGO's use of Mana King's persona
in their game appropriated the rights of the estate to use the warrior's
image in its own line of toys to teach children Maori history, losing the
ability to profit from Mana King's performance in this commercial
context.
The other right of publicity cases found in Part II may also work for
the estate of Mana King. In Molony v. Boy Comics Publisher,312 the
court refused to protect a hero's right of publicity. This young coast
guard officer could not enjoin the defendant publisher from depicting
his heroics following a plane crash at the Empire State Building be-
cause the Real Hero comic book depicted real life events and was not
used in advertising or trade, even though the comic book was sold. 313
In the present hypothetical dispute, Mana King's estate would have an
easier time proving that the warrior's image was used in trade, but this
finding is not certain. This factual question would depend on a deeper
inquiry into the exact manner and use of Mana King's image in the
LEGO game and the advertising.
Finally, Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys 3 14 appears to parallel the
hypothetical dispute between Mana King's estate and LEGO. In
Landham, the defendant produced an action toy based on a character
from the film Predator.315 The actor who played "Billy the Native
American Tracker" character sued, claiming the toy violated his right
of publicity.31 6 The court held that the actor's identity was sufficiently
separate from the identity of "Billy the Native American Tracker. '317
Therefore, the plaintiff actor's right of publicity remained intact. 31 8
In the situation of Mana King, alternatively, there is no line of de-
marcation between the man and the character. Mana King was not
playing a role. Therefore, Landharn may bolster the estate's case.
Another case also lends support to Mana King's estate's fight to main-
tain control of his persona: Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tri-
bal Court.319 In this dispute, discussed in detail in Part II, the estate of
312. 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1950).
313. See id. at 124.
314. 277 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000).
315. Id. at 621.
316. See id.
317. See id. at 626.
318. See id.
319. 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Crazy Horse won a battle against Hornell Brewing Company in tribal
court on right of publicity grounds.320
Again, Hornell Brewing Company used the image of the Sioux
leader Crazy Horse on its malt liquor beverage. 321 The tribal court,
even though later reversed due to jurisdictional issues, found that
Hornell Brewing Company had appropriated Crazy Horse's image, vi-
olating his estate's right of publicity.322 This line of reasoning extends
naturally to the fictional instance of using Mana King to sell LEGO
games and toys.
Of the three intellectual property regimes discussed in this Com-
ment, indigenous groups may find the most protection under right of
publicity laws. This option is narrow, however, and restricted to spe-
cific commerical uses of indigenous personas. Of course, in the real
dispute between the Maori and LEGO, LEGO did not cross into this
right of publicity territory.
IV. IMPACT: STRIKING A BALANCE THROUGH A SYSTEM OF
DOMAINE PUBLIC PA YANT
Controversies surrounding use of cultural heritage elements in com-
mercial contexts is on the rise, as evidenced by the debate between
LEGO and the Maori. If this trend continues, U.S. courts will be
faced with the impossible task of applying current intellectual prop-
erty law to claims of cultural heritage appropriation. This Comment
demonstrates that current U.S. intellectual property regimes are inad-
equate to fairly and efficiently deal with valid claims of cultural misap-
propriation. 323 The relevant tension is: How do we safeguard cultural
heritage that is worthy of protection while simultaneously preserving a
rich pool of common ideas? It is a challenge to avoid an over-protec-
tionist system 324 that stifles creativity and tramples First Amendment
rights of free speech. Yet, it is important to recognize that some cul-
tural heritage slipping through the cracks of the intellectual property
320. Id. at 1093.
321. See supra text accompanying note 57.
322. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d at 1087.
323. After reviewing the regimes of trademark, copyright, and right of publicity law, it is clear
that cultural heritage claims do not fit neatly into any of these categories. This does not suggest
that all claims of cultural appropriation are deserving of legal accommodation; however, valid
claims could exist that have insufficient legal recourse. For example, if a recording company
were to record songs performed in an indigenous ceremony, incorporate them into a popular
culture song and profit from their use, the indigenous singers may have a difficult time mounting
a successful legal battle. The proposed system of domaine public payant may step in to protect
works that have slipped into this gray area that lies between the public and private domains.
324. If legislators were to develop an overbroad scheme to protect cultural heritage it would
drain the public domain, robbing creators of useful ideas and inspiration.
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system 325 is vulnerable to misuse and deserves protection. 32 6 There-
fore, a novel compromise 327 is necessary to accommodate this unique
sector of cultural heritage.
A. Domaine Public Payant Defined
A system of domaine public payant328 may be the answer to cultural
heritage tug of wars. In this system, the state is the guardian of its
own cultural heritage. 32 9 It acts as the liaison between indigenous
groups that supply the cultural heritage and the end-users of that
knowledge. 330 One author defines domaine public payant as:
[A] legislative scheme that imposes a fee for the use or economic
exploitation of works in the public domain. Funds received are fun-
neled into societies that provide for the welfare of creative workers
and their families or into state administrative agencies for the pro-
motion of cultural activities and exchange. 331
325. Defining which types of works would be eligible for inclusion into a domaine public
payant system must be left to each state to determine. One route is to include only works that
once had copyright protection, but which has now expired. If the work could be deemed cultural
heritage, it would be eligible for inclusion. However, this avenue would exclude much of the
work highlighted in this Comment, such as folklore. While developing standards for inclusion
into a domaine public payant system, the state must assess its own goals and identify how best to
preserve its own cultural heritage.
326. The cultural heritage that would be eligible for inclusion in the domaine public payant
system would not be eligible for protection under other U.S. intellectual property regimes. If it
were, there would be no logical need of this new form of protection. Examples of eligible works
might include folklore, the performance of sacred ceremonies, and ancient tribal chants. As
discussed in this Comment, these elements of indigenous oral cultures often fail to meet stan-
dards for protection under traditional intellectual property laws; therefore, they would benefit
from another form of compromised protection.
327. It is necessary to note that this proposed system of domaine public payant is a true com-
promise in the sense that neither side will be completely content with the result. Successful
compromises give each side in a debate something of what they ask for, but also refuses some-
thing else. In this instance, indigenous groups may desire, foremost, to completely exclude their
cultural heritage from the commercial realm. Compensation may not even be an issue. On the
other hand, commercial users want unfettered access to this cultural heritage. The compromise
of domaine public payant offers indigenous groups the promise of only partial control over their
cultural heritage and minimal compensation (even if compensation was not their main objec-
tive). In turn, it offers commercial users limited access to the cultural heritage, yet requires them
to pay a fee they would like to avoid.
328. See Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural
Property, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 307-08 (1994). The author proposes a system to protect
works of cultural heritage based on the legal rubric of domaine public payant in which the state
acts as the guardian of its own cultural heritage.
329. Perhaps the state could inherit these works after copyright protection expires.
330. See Berryman, supra note 328 and accompanying text. Internationally, some states have
introduced this system to monitor the movement and use of physical cultural property. This
notion, the author argues, could protect the integrity of intangible cultural property as well.
331. See id. at 307-08. This author was forward thinking in her solutions for claims of cultural
heritage appropriation. Note that this article was published in 1994, well before the widely pub-
licized debate over the REDSKINS trademark or the Maori/LEGO dispute at issue.
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This system protects cultural heritage while simultaneously allowing
controlled access to valuable cultural works and knowledge.
Domaine public payant is analogous to a library in which cultural
heritage is shelved. Patrons may browse indefinitely, looking through
all of the information stored there. If one chooses to "borrow" a spe-
cific work he must: (1) pay a reasonable fee; (2) keep it in good condi-
tion; and (3) return it for others to use after him. Described below is a
detailed discussion developing the benefits of each of these three ele-
ments of the system and how domaine public payant could have been
utilized in the Maori/LEGO debate.
1. Fee Schemes
A system of set, compulsory fees provides valuable funding to indig-
enous communities and cultural organizations. This ensures that the
cycle of creativity continues. It also establishes fair practice in which
all who wish to use the cultural heritage have equal access to it.332
The typical fee structures available under a domaine public payant
system vary. Charges may (1) be either perpetual or limited in dura-
tion; (2) vary depending on the type of work; and (3) apply to foreign
works housed in a state's public domain. 333 This flexibility in fee
structures allows a state334 to tailor its own scheme to best serve its
unique needs and preference.
In the case of the Maori/LEGO dispute, a fee structure would have
benefited both groups. Currently, the Maori have not been moneta-
rily compensated for LEGO's use of the Maori elements in the Bion-
icle game. A mandatory fee structure would have ensured that the
Maori community335 receive some funding when LEGO "borrowed"
elements of their culture, provided the language would even be eligi-
ble for inclusion into a domaine public payant system. 3 36
332. Granted, it is usually less of a burden for a corporation to dole out payment than it is for
the struggling artist. Perhaps the fee structure could reflect this inequity in wealth of the appli-
cants. Or, it could base fees on a royalty basis, charging those who make money off of the work
a higher price.
333. See id. at 308.
334. In this Comment, "state" refers to a body and can include a nation, a group of United
Nations, or singular territories.
335. It is important to note that the Maori cannot be classified simply as a homogenous group.
Different tribes exist under the Maori umbrella and all represent different interests. The Maori
often disagree among themselves, placing importance on different issues. Perhaps, this division
of interests is what has hampered the drafting of the Guidelines for the Use of Traditional
Knowledge proposed by LEGO.
336. See Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1997). Farley explains the difference between
public domain systems, which only protect works that would have been eligible for copyright
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2. Preservation of the Work's Integrity
Beyond a desire for compensation, guardians and creators of tradi-
tional knowledge probably fear that unchecked use may result in its
mutilation or alteration. This is at the heart of many debates over the
use (or misuse) of traditional knowledge. A domaine public payant
system contains safeguards against this by instituting guidelines for
use. Returning to the library analogy, patrons cannot deface, alter, or
damage a book and expect to return it to the library with no conse-
quence. To protect against such violations, domaine public payant sys-
tems impose sanctions when necessary. 337 Cathryn Berryman deftly
illustrates the purpose and effectiveness of sanctions:
To avoid stifling any creativity or distribution, public domain legisla-
tion strikes a balance between freedom of use and preservation of
integrity. Sanctions are imposed only on those uses that violate the
work's essence, cultural value, or reputation. Thus, modern adapta-
tions, translations, or republications are allowed as long as the
work's character is maintained.338
This type of perpetual protection for a work's integrity reflects a
system of moral rights,339 which protect creators' rights of paternity
protection and domaine public payant systems, which extends protection to works that may not
be eligible for copyright protection:
Public Domain statutes basically provide moral rights in perpetuity. Public Domain
legislation is intended to "prevent or sanction use of public domain works in such a way
as to prejudice their authenticity or identity." Public domain works can be used as the
basis of derivative works so long as the use does not violate the work's essence, cultural
value, or reputation. Thus, this scheme appears to provide the appropriate safeguard to
the indigenous community's cultural interests, especially those who want to protect sa-
cred imagery. Protection is extended, however, only to works whose copyright protec-
tion has expired and to works that would have qualified for copyright protection had
the legislation existed at the time they were created.
Id.
Another related mechanism is Domaine Public Payant. Domaine Public Payant is a
legislative scheme that imposes a fee for the use of works in the public domain. In other
words, when no author can be identified, one who uses an otherwise copyrightable
work must pay a royalty to the state. The funds raised usually will go to support arts
organizations and could therefore be directed at indigenous arts councils. Domaine
Public Payant does not apply to the use of public domain works that constitute deriva-
tive works of sufficient originality. No common law country has ever experimented with
this type of legislation.
Id. at 49-50. See also Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
929, 969-70 (2002) (discussing and critiquing the feasibility of implementing a domaine public
payant system).
337. See Berryman, supra note 328, at 304.
338. See id. at 304-05.
339. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 25 (laying out an in-depth discussion of the history,
development, and benefits of a moral rights system). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Pre-
serving Personality and Reputational Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A
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and integrity even after the tangible or intangible rights to the work
have been assigned. In the United States, moral rights protection has
been extended to creators of visual art only;340 other artists do not
enjoy this reputational control.341
Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151 (2001) (advocating the protec-
tion of the personal interests of personas under federal copyright law's moral-rights doctrine).
340. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). The relevant sections provide:
§ 106A. Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity
(a) Rights of attribution and integrity. Subject to section 107 and independent of the
exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art-
(1) shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which
he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work
of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the right-
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distor-
tion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.
(b) Scope and exercise of rights. Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights
conferred by subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the copyright
owner. The authors of a joint work of visual art are coowners of the rights conferred by
subsection (a) in that work.
(e) Transfer and waiver.
(1) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, but those rights may
be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed
by the author. Such instrument shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that
work, to which the waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses
so identified. In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors, a waiver of
rights under this paragraph made by one such author waives such rights for all such
authors.
(2) Ownership of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a work of visual
art is distinct from ownership of any copy of that work, or of a copyright or any exclu-
sive right under a copyright in that work. Transfer of ownership of any copy of a work
of visual art, or of a copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright, shall not consti-
tute a waiver of the rights conferred by subsection (a). Except as may otherwise be
agreed by the author in a written instrument signed by the author, a waiver of the rights
conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a work of visual art shall not constitute a
transfer of ownership of any copy of that work, or of ownership of a copyright or of any
exclusive right under a copyright in that work.
Id.
341. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 111, § 8D.01. Nimmer outlines the basics of moral
rights and the doctrine's French origins succinctly in his treatise:
§ 8D.01 Introduction
A-Types of Moral Rights
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The United States has very limited moral rights protection for cre-
ators because the American construction of intellectual property is
still too narrowly tied to the notion of physical property law. Owner-
ship and disposition are fundamental to tangible property. Once you
sell property you lose all rights to it. A system of moral rights allows a
creator to dispose of the intellectual property through a license or a
transfer, yet he maintains assurances that his work cannot be altered
inappropriately. Necessarily, a transferee's rights are limited within a
system of moral rights. This element of the domaine public payant
system could make this option unattractive to legislators intent on fit-
Certain countries of the world have long recognized rights personal to authors, and as
such viable separate and apart from the economic aspect of copyright. Their separate
viability is such that a full transfer of copyright may suffice for all economic purposes,
but may exert no impact on the assertion of these claims. In France, home country to
the doctrine, these rights are known as le droit moral, or moral rights. "The adjective
'moral' has no precise English equivalent, although 'spiritual', 'non-economic' and 'per-
sonal'convey something of the intended meaning."
It is beyond the scope of this treatise to treat moral rights under the laws of their
European homelands. Some may overlap others, and perhaps no country affords every
conceivable species of moral right. In brief, the following summary encompasses the
various rights that can be grouped together under this rubric. First, there are numerous
variations on the attribution right (droit au respect du nom; also, droit a la paternite):
- the right to be known as the author of his work;
- the right to prevent others from falsely attributing to him the authorship of a work
that he has not in fact written;
- the right to prevent others from being named as the author of his work;
- the right to publish a work anonymously or pseudonymously, as well as the right to
change his mind at a later date and claim authorship under his own name;
- the right to prevent others from using the work or the author's name in such a way as
to reflect adversely on his professional standing.
In addition, there are several distinct categories that comprise the classic droit moral:
- the right to prevent others from making deforming changes in his work (droit au
respect de l'oeuvre);
- the right to publish a work, or to withhold it from dissemination (droit de divulgation);
and
- the right to withdraw a published work from distribution if it no longer represents the
views of the author (droit de retrait; also, droit de repentir).
Under French law, the moral right is conceived as perpetual, inalienable, and impre-
scriptible. In theory, therefore, even today in France, an outrageous stage or film ver-
sion of Le Medecin Malgre Lui could be challenged and subjected to the full range of
sanctions for violation of the moral right. Moreover, even if Moliere's line has long
since expired in the three centuries since that play was penned, the French state might
still be able to protect the integrity right under a parens patriae (emphasis in original)
theory.
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ting the square peg of intellectual property into the round hole of real
property law.
Nevertheless, if the United States employed this system, the Maori
could be certain that any traditional knowledge within the domaine
public payant would preserve its integrity. Perhaps LEGO would
have been precluded from using the sacred Tohunga name to signify a
plastic toy that the Maori found offensive. 342
3. Nonexclusive Rights to the Cultural Heritage
Again returning to our library analogy, a user must return the book
so others may borrow it after him. In the realm of intellectual prop-
erty, it is impossible to steal away a nonphysical work, however, this
"return" concept translates to intangible property because domaine
public payant structures require that all potential users have access to
the work. No one user may exclude others from also using the
work. 343 Anyone has access to the traditional knowledge, subject to a
fee and controls.
B. Domaine Public Payant as a Compromise
These three elements of a domaine public payant system, a fee
structure, preservation of integrity, and open access to all, combine to
create a reasonable, workable solution to disputes over cultural heri-
tage. Through state control, both creators of intangible works of cul-
tural value and their consumers can be assured of getting some of
what they want. Creators, as a group, benefit by an injection of fund-
ing into local cultural programs and individual and group creators are
assured the integrity of their work will be preserved. On the other
side of the transaction, users gain access to valuable cultural works for
a nominal price. This system does not foster a hyper-protective intel-
lectual property environment, nor does it allow commercial users free
reign to manipulate a state's precious cultural heritage. Domaine pub-
lic payant is an intelligent compromise.
342. E-Mail from Maui Solomon, Maori Attorney, to Sarah La Voi, Student, DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law (Nov. 11, 2002, 10:25:51 CST) (on file with author).
343. See Berryman, supra note 328, at 309. Berryman states that a copyright holder's rights
effectively transfer to the state upon expiration. The scope of those rights changes, however.
The guardian of the domaine public payant system allows non-exclusive rights to everyone who
wishes to use the work and agrees to the regulations. In copyright law, an owner's rights include
the ability to exclude others from infringing his work. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Comment highlights a current trend in which indigenous
groups challenge commercial users of cultural heritage. This form of
dispute is exemplified by the Maori demands that LEGO purge its
Bionicle game of Maori language and history. Review of the current
U.S. intellectual property regimes of trademark, copyright, and right
of publicity reveals that the Maori's claims would likely fail because
language and bits of history are not protectable intellectual property.
Currently, they belong in the public domain, free for all to use.
Yet, legitimate disputes surrounding cultural heritage do exist.344
Indigenous groups with valid claims are handicapped by an inflexible
system of U.S. intellectual property laws that cannot accommodate
the unique nature of traditional knowledge. In disputes that include
relevant claims of cultural heritage appropriation, such as the theft of
sacred chants or folklore or the manipulation of sacred imagery, U.S.
law is inadequate. States have a vested interest in protecting their
cultural heritage and should legislate to provide a system to do so.
Domaine public payant, a system in which the state regulates the
transactions of traditional knowledge between creators and users, fa-
cilitates the needs of all interested parties. Creators receive limited
control over how the cultural heritage is used and indirect funding
while users have access to a vast pool of inspiration. Domaine public
payant simultaneously protects cultural integrity while fueling crea-
tion. The United States should adopt this legal structure.
VI. ADDENDUM: HARJO V. PRO-FOoTBALL, INC. REVERSED
This Comment refers throughout to the TTAB's 1999 decision in
Harjo, which led to the cancellation of several trademarks owned by
Pro-Football, Inc.345 In September 2003, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia reversed Harjo.3 46 The district
court reviewed whether the trademarks at issue, when used in the con-
344. See Press Release, New Zealand's Intellectual Property Concerns (May 1, 2003), availa-
ble at http:l/www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/po0305/500012.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). This
release announces Maori opposition to Sony's use of Maori imagery, names, and sacred tools in
its ultra-violent video game, "The Mark of the Kri." The press release quotes the Maori man
behind this new cultural heritage protection campaign: "Sony have 'hitched a ride' on New
Zealand's heritage with absolutely no concern or respect for New Zealand Maori ..... Id. This
Maori opposition to Sony's use of cultural heritage in a violent video game differs from Maori
complaints against LEGO; indeed the facts are different and raise varying issues. This is evi-
dence that the trend towards litigation in the cultural heritage arena continues to gain
momentum.
345. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
346. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Suzan Shown Harjo, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17180 (2003).
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text of Pro-Football's services, "may disparage a substantial composite
of Native Americans. '347 According to the court, the marks must
have been found to be offensive when they were registered in 1967.348
The court held that the TTAB's evidentiary findings did not consti-
tute the "substantial evidence" necessary to support its decision that
the REDSKINS trademarks "were disparaging to a substantial com-
posite of Native Americans. ' 349 In its opinion, the court reiterates
that its findings are based solely on a lack of evidence and that the
decision should not be considered a comment on the issue of using
Native American imagery for sports teams.350 The defendants, led by
Suzan Shown Harjo, have filed an appeal.35'
Sarah La Voi*
347. Id. at 139.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. James V. Grimaldi, Taking a New Team Into Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2003, at E01.
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